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Abstract
Majority of the agoa impact literature have mainly resorted to regression analysis.
In this paper, a change towards constructing a counter-factual set of countries is adopted.
In doing this, the propensity score matching framework is used in estimating the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the agoa policy on recipient countries. The res-
ults show that countries exporting to the USA did increase their shares of agoa exports
while reducing their share under the most favoured nation tariffs. The exports levels on
the other hand, are not significant in most cases. In comparing the shares of exports to
the USA to those of the EU and rest of the world, an unambiguous decrease in the share
of exports to the rest of the world is observed. However, the shares of exports to the
USA and EU in most cases increased. The contribution of the paper is in providing a
consistent and robust matching framework to study the agoa trade preferences.
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1 Introduction
The provision of trade preferences is to provide market access opportunities to develop-
ing countries. The USA’s provision of agoa is expected to lead to an increase in exports
from African beneficiary countries to the USA. In addition, it is expected to have a
direct and indirect feedback in the economies of the beneficiary countries. The direct
effects would include job creation and investment opportunities as new enterprises are
created to take advantage of the new export opportunities to the USA. The indirect ef-
fects on the other hand, includes other opportunities created—for example a boost in
the service industry activities related to exporting. These could well be banking and
insurance products for exporters as well as increased tax revenue for the African bene-
ficiaries from the increased exporting activities. These advantages can only be derived
if beneficiary governments provide the necessary support and enabling environment to
promote businesses taking up the challenge to export to the USA.
In this paper, I seek not only to measure the impact of agoa but also, to carefully
construct a counter-factual to measure the impact of agoa I intend to show that the ex-
isting empirical literature on the impact of agoa would continue to provide a positive
and exaggerated impact due to the counter-factual used within the regression frame-
work in those studies. The departure here, is by constructing a comparable group of
counter-factual countries that are similar in several respects to the beneficiary countries
to measure this impact.
There exists a considerable number of studies evaluating the impact of agoa on
the beneficiaries (for example, Collier and Venables, 2007, Condon and Stern, 2011,
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010, Nouve, 2005, Nouve and Staatz, 2003, Seyoum,
2007, Tadesse and Fayissa, 2008, Tadesse et al., 2008). I add to this literature by trying
to estimating the impact of agoa on beneficiary countries using a novel methodological
approach that is becoming popular in the economic literature. Existing studies base their
analysis on traditional econometrics (these include, Lederman and O¨zden, 2007, Nouve,
2005, Seyoum, 2007) while others use the evaluation methodology (for instance, Collier
and Venables, 2007, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010). In this paper, the propensity
score matching approach is used in the analysis. The problem in studying the impact
is that the counter-factual is not available. Thus matching is a way of constructing a
counter-factual to measure the impact of agoa on the exports of recipients.
In matching agoa countries to other developing countries a vector of variables con-
taining characteristics of both countries are used to make the match. It is assumed that
there is independence between the treatment and the controls. Previous studies (for ex-
ample Collier and Venables, 2007, GAO, 2008, USITC, 2007) point to large increases in
the exports of agoa beneficiaries to the USA. One could therefore compare the exports
to the USA by agoa recipients to the counter-factual to test whether there was a signi-
ficant increase compared to non–agoa countries. Nevertheless, the coefficients of both
regressions can be compared to observe the size of the changes compared to non–agoa
recipients.
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The main question asked in this paper is “Whether there has been an observed in-
crease in the exports of agoa recipients to the USA compared to the counter-factual
(other non–agoa countries)?” A related question is, whether exports to the European
Union decreased in response to the agoa adoption compared to the counter-factual coun-
tries. To start us off in answering this question I consider the following objectives:
• To provide appropriate matching and evaluation frameworks for the agoa coun-
tries exporting to the USA to provide a causal explanation of any increase in ex-
ports.
• Match agoa countries to other developing countries using identifiable characterist-
ics and features such as economic size, distance to international markets, common
colonial heritage, common language, religion, capital/labour intensities and cul-
tural background among others.
The two main hypotheses to be tested in the paper are
• agoa countries export less to the USA than other developing countries after con-
trolling for similar characteristics.
• agoa exports have displaced apparel and textile exports to the European Union.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the stylised
facts of the export data and a theoretical framework for the subsequent analysis. The
third section discusses the data and econometric approach used, followed by a discussion
of the results obtained. The final section concludes the paper.
2 Stylised Facts and Theoretical Framework
2.1 Stylised Facts
A few diagrams are presented here to show some of the stylised facts of the data. In
the diagrams, several SSA countries had majority of their exports to the USA not re-
ceiving the gsp preference. Rather a large share of exports to the USA did not claim
any preferential treatment and instead received the most favoured nation (mfn) (no pro-
gramme) tariffs. After the inception of agoa, uptake of the preference has been markedly
different—some countries have seen a phenomenal increase in their share of agoa out
of total exports to the USA. Notably, these shares have varied over the years after 2001.
The countries with high shares at particular points in time include Lesotho, Swaziland,
Malawi, Madagascar, Nigeria and Kenya—larger than 60% of their exports to the USA
in Figures (1, 2 & 3). Figure (1) plots the shares of agoa and no programme imports
by the USA out of total imports for each agoa beneficiary on the horizontal and vertical
axes respectively. Figure (2) on the other hand, has the gsp share on the vertical axis.
Countries with high shares of gsp exports prior to agoa seem to have done well in in-
creasing their share of agoa exports. This could well be due to gsp products that have
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been subsumed under agoa preferences. On the contrary, there are a couple of coun-
tries that have not seen significant gains in their agoa exports to the USA (for example,
Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda among others). The final graph in this section,
figure (3) shows the relationship between the gsp and no programme import shares.
Figure (1) paints a picture of the gradual decline in no programme USA import
shares for each agoa recipient. The cross-section relationship becomes negative after
the inception of agoa. The countries gradually push out towards the lower right end
of the graphs in figure (1). The relationship with the gsp shares is however not that
clear. However, the graphs depict an increase in the agoa share for a large number of
the beneficiaries. Over time gsp shares have fallen below 50% for a large majority of
beneficiaries. The notable exception is Mauritania in 2008. Malawi and Cape Verde
had high gsp shares in 1999. By 2002 they no longer had high shares of gsp—agoa
had replaced much of their gsp exports. The experience among the beneficiaries has
been relatively heterogeneous. Countries with initial high shares of gsp exports have
ceded much of these shares to agoa. On the other hand, countries that exported mostly
under the mfn regime (no programme) have increased their agoa shares by reducing the
exports under the mfn regime. For other countries the increase in their agoa share has
been a combination of declining gsp and mfn regime shares.
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Figure 1: agoa vs. No Programme Shares in total Imports
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Figure 2: agoa vs GSP Shares in total Imports
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Figure 3: Non Programme vs GSP Shares in total Imports
2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 Preferential Trade Agreements
The customs union theory of Viner (1950) and Meade (1955) have formed the basis
for most of the theoretical discussion of preferential trade agreements. In their customs
union theory, trade can either be “trade creating” or “trade diverting”. Trade creation
happens to be the more favourable outcome whereby welfare of countries in the union
improves. Trade diversion on the other hand, leads to lower welfare for member coun-
tries. In line with this tradition there have been other works such as Cooper and Massell
(1965), Lipsey (1960), Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) and McMillan and McCann (1981)
that review the existing Vinerian tradition and in some cases extend the work of Viner
(1950). Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) provide an analysis within the framework of the
second best theory McMillan and McCann (1981) in particular provide a synthesis of
the works of Meade, Vanek and Lipsey. They suggest that a country gains from forming
a customs union if their import competing items are net substitutes with the imported
items (McMillan and McCann, 1981). In this case, the partner country’s welfare im-
proves from the formation of the union (McMillan and McCann, 1981). An implication
they highlight is that, if all commodities are net substitutes, gradual tariff reduction be-
comes an incentive for global free trade. Kemp and Wan (1976) is also an extension that
is popular within this literature. Kemp and Wan (1976, 1) suggest that “... there exists
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a common tariff vector which is consistent with pre-union world prices and, therefore,
with pre-union trade patterns and pre-union levels of welfare for nonmembers.” Es-
sentially, this suggests that welfare for members improves while that of the rest of the
world does not necessarily fall (Krishna, 2005). More recently, Krishna (2005, 2012),
Panagariya (1997, 2000) and Panagariya and Krishna (2002) have provided surveys of
the preferential trade agreement literature as well as extensions in new directions.
Krishna (2003) presents an empirical implementation of the role of geography in
preferential trade agreements. Krishna (2003) find that geographic proximity and trad-
ing volumes do not affect welfare significantly and thus find no support for the nat-
ural trading partners theory for the specific instance of USA data (this is in line with
Panagariya, 1997).
Working within the preferential trade agreement literature, figure (4) is modified
to provide the framework within which the analysis in this paper follows. Figure (4)
highlights the potential for a country receiving preferential tariffs to increase their supply
of exports in the preference giving market. Due to the higher price (as a result of lower
tariffs) they supply more relative to other countries that face a higher tariff. Here it
is assumed that τmfn > τgsp > τagoa and γmfn > γpref ; τmfn = γmfn τgsp = γpref
initially; costs associated with uptake of the preferences (for example rules of origin and
associated costs) are ignored; exporters from the beneficiary countries are prices takers
and individual countries cannot influence prices on the world market or in the USA. The
starting point is where mfn and preferential tariffs are the same for both destinations.
The imposition of a third tariff lower than the existing tariffs then results in the changes
discussed below.
These exporters would supply as much of the product given the world prices (P). The
differentiation in prices is provided by the different tariffs applied on exports supplied.
The greater the price differential, the more incentive firms in beneficiary countries have
to export more to the USA. As long as τagoa > γpref it would motivate exporters to
switch to the USA market. This occurs more readily if firms are already exporting to
the USA. However, for firms not exporting to the USA this would then depend on the
costs of finding partners in the USA and satisfying rules of origin requirements. If the
gains from the lower tariffs are larger than the costs facing firms, then the firms would
take up the new market opportunities. In this example, the export supply curves are not
shifted down given that the beneficiaries are price takers. In addition, given the levels
of exports, it is expected that, exports switched from the ROW to the USA would be
covered by the remaining countries to maintain the existing equilibria. The difference
is that with the new equilibria, there are fewer exports from agoa beneficiaries to ROW
but more exports to the USA under the agoa tariffs. Not only a switch of exports from
ROW but also, one should expect already existing exports to the USA to be realigned
with a higher composition of exports under the lower agoa tariffs. Thus, within the USA
exports under agoa would displace some of the already existing exports under gsp and
mfn categories for the beneficiary countries.
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The X’s stand for the export supply at the various tariffs. P is the world price, τi and γi represent the tariffs, γpref represents any
competing preferential or gsp tariffs offered by ROW. The mfn=most favoured nation tariff.
Figure 4: Net Import demand and tariff preferences
2.2.2 Constant Market Share Analysis
The constant market share analysis framework is reviewed here also since it bears some
similarities to the analysis carried out in this paper. The theory traces its roots to Leamer
and Stern (1970), Richardson (1971a,b) and Tyszynksi (1951). Recent work on the topic
include Ahmadi-Esfahani (2006), Fagerberg and Sollie (1987) and Merkies and van der
Meer (1988). The review here together with the framework presented in the previous
subsection (section (2.2.1)) above forms the basis of the propositions outlined below
and tested in the results section.
The theory by Leamer and Stern (1970) and Richardson (1971a) suggest that, the
market share of a country depends on the share of its exports in world exports and its
competitiveness relative to the world.
s ≡ q
Q
= f
(
c
C
)
, f ′ > 0 ,
where s is the market share, q is exports of the country of interest, Q is world exports or
exports of a reference country, c and C are the competitiveness of the country of interest
and the world respectively. This leads one to the identity,
q˙ ≡ sQ˙+Qs˙ = sQ˙+Qf ′
(
c˙
C
)
where the dot over a variable represents its derivative with respect to time. The identity
suggests that a country’s growth in exports can be decomposed into growth as a result of
an increase in world exports and a competitive effect due to changes in the competitive-
ness of the country (Richardson, 1971a). The model above is for total exports, however,
this can be disaggregated over destination markets and products and the result would
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still hold (Richardson, 1971a).
sij ≡ qij
Qij
= fij
(
cij
Cij
)
, f ′ij > 0 ,
where i refers to a commodity and j to an export destination. Similarly, the decomposi-
tion is,
q˙ ≡
∑
i
∑
j
sijQ˙ij +
∑
i
∑
j
Qij ˙sij
This motivates the framework below for motivating the choice of matching in this
section. The matching approach requires as explained in the next section the construc-
tion of a counter-factual based on a control group of countries. Thus using matching
one is able to compare the shares, export growth as well as the levels of exports to the
reference group of countries formed by the counter-factual—on the basis of an estim-
ated propensity score. Using the framework, the export shares for each agoa beneficiary
i to destination j can be written as exports of the agoa countries relative to the counter-
factual countries forming the reference group.
sij ≡ xij
xrj
= f
(
pij
prj
)
, j ∈ (EU,USA,ROW ),
i ∈ (agoa countries), r ∈ (reference countries)
In similar fashion, the increase in exports of the agoa beneficiaries can be decomposed
into the growth effect due to the reference countries and a competitive effect. Borrowing
from Leamer and Stern (1970) and Richardson (1971a), the growth effect arises from
the growth in their exports as a result of keeping their shares constant (in other words,
due to prices not changing). On the other hand, the competitive effect is due to the
relatively lower tariffs that provides them with favourable prices making their exports
more competitive in market j.
x˙ij ≡ sij ˙xrj + xrj ˙sij = f
(
pij
prj
)
˙xrj + xrjf
′
(
˙pij
prj
)
,
Thus, much of the gains made in increasing exports would be due to the relatively more
attractive tariff preferences and the selection of products exported. In other words, fa-
vourable preferences leading to higher prices being received by the exporters is sup-
posed to spur export growth. Growth would be from an increase in total exports by the
agoa beneficiaries and partly from the higher shares they obtain in the market. Exporters
exporting to destinations offering lower tariffs receive a higher proportion of the price—
thus they increase their exports to destinations with lower tariffs—thereby increasing the
countries exports to that particular destination. However, the response of exports will
depend on whether the lower tariffs are provided for products the preference beneficiar-
ies have a comparative advantage in production as well as their competitiveness in the
market relative to other exporters.
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2.2.3 Theoretical framework for using matching
Section (2.1) highlighted the increase in agoa exports for beneficiaries. The noticeable
feature was that the level of exports upon which comparisons are made were fairly low
compared to the Caribbean Basin countries. The graphs also highlighted the restructur-
ing of exports to the USA and showed the increasing share of agoa exports to the USA
out of total exports by beneficiaries. Based on the above, four propositions would be
presented and tested in the empirical analysis. At the moment these are only presented
as propositions/hypotheses short of providing any rigorous mathematical proofs, but re-
lying on economic intuition and the framework presented above to present the arguments
in this section.
For simplicity, exports of each country is considered to three destinations—the EU,
USA and the rest of the world (ROW).
Xiworld =
k∑
i=1
j−2∑
i=1
XiROW +
k∑
i=1
XiUSA +
k∑
i=1
XiEU ,
whereX represents exports in each case. Taking the share of exports to each destination
in total exports and rearranging gives the following relationship,
siUSA = 1− siROW − siEU ,
where s represents the share in total exports. An implication of the above relationship
is that for any increase in the share of exports to the USA, exports to the EU or to ROW
must decrease or some combination that would yield a lower aggregate share. The
propositions listed below are based on this relationship and for the moment the EU is
subsumed under ROW. This does not necessarily alter any of the conclusions. However,
in the analysis EU is considered separately from ROW.
A similarly approach is taken for exports to the USA. Exports to the USA are as-
sumed to be under either gsp exports, no programme (or most favoured nation (mfn)
tariff ). For the purposes of this study, the residual exports that are not any of the above
are considered non–gsp to make it easier to compare this category across countries.
Thus, total exports (Xi) for each country to the USA is composed of gsp, non–gsp and
no programme exports.
XiUSA =
k∑
i=1
XiGSP +
k∑
i=1
XiNG +
k∑
i=1
XiNP ,
The shares out of total exports to the USA is,
siNG = 1− siGSP − siNP ,
From the above, any increases in non–gsp exports must either be as a result of a de-
crease in the share of gsp or no programme exports. Arguably, this presupposes that any
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increases would result in exports switching from one destination to the other or from
one programme to the other. In the analysis, the two share equations need to analysed to
provide definitive indications as to whether exports to the USA increased in addition to
exports being shifted from the other tariff categories to the non–gsp category. For agoa
beneficiaries, the non–gsp would represent their exports under the agoa programme.
The are no other special programmes that would overstate the residual.
Proposition 1 (Export Switching/Diversion) Countries decrease exports to the rest of
the world and increase their exports to the USA.
Proposition 2 (Compositional Change) Countries do not decrease exports to the rest
of the world and their exports to the USA stays the same.
Proposition 3 (Export Creation) Countries increase their exports to the rest of the
world and also to the USA. But the increase in exports to the USA is proportionately
more than the increase in exports to the ROW (trade creation due to increased capacity).
Proposition 4 (Status Quo) No compositional changes or increase in exports
It is likely that a combination of these propositions occur. For instance, it is possible
that in the very short-run before plant capacities are increased, proposition (2) would be
more likely to hold. Moreover, proposition (1) is more likely to be a short–medium run
event while proposition (3) would more likely hold in the longer–run.
Proposition (1) suggests that, the share of agoa, gsp and no-programme exports
might all increase in which case one expects the share for agoa to increase propor-
tionately more than the other programmes. This increase is postulated to result from a
reduction in exports to the rest of the world, which is then taken up in the exports to the
USA. Thus one would expect an increase in both the extensive and intensive margins of
exports.
In the case of proposition (2), the share of agoa exports increases while the share of
no-programme exports unambiguously falls. The share of gsp exports could go either
way. I expect the restructuring to be within exports to the USA and hence export levels
remain the same. Similarly, one might not expect to see extensive margin effects al-
though one cannot completely rule out intensive margin effects. I thus propose that
exports to the USA does not increase, however, exporters already in the market can
easily switch to agoa from the other programmes if their products are covered by the
preference. This follows from the firm level literature on exporting (for example, Bern-
ard and Jensen, 2004, Bernard et al., 2007, 2010, Melitz, 2003) whereby exporting firms
have to overcome the sunk cost of exporting and finding new destinations as well as de-
veloping new relationships in the USA. For firms already exporting these sunk costs
would have already been incurred and existing trade relationships established. The only
changes necessary would be in applying for the agoa preference as the product reaches
the USA instead of the programmes chosen previously. This is a more probable scenario
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and not only is it of benefit to the exporters but also should allow the importing firms in
the USA to receive products at some fraction of the costs they had in previous years.
For proposition (3), the share of agoa exports might increase more than proportion-
ately relative to the shares of gsp and no-programme shares This suggests an expansion
of exports bordering on both intensive and extensive margins. Finally, for Proposition
(4) no changes are expected and the status quo remains. Thus intensive and extensive
margin effects would not be realised.
Propositions (1–3) are more likely and the data tends to support these. Proposition
(4) is unlikely to be supported by the data. In section (4) all three propositions are
formally tested. Proposition (3) would provide a more favourable outcome and would
allow the conclusion of agoa increasing exports to be beyond doubt. Compositional
changes do not provide a major structural change in exports and do not provide long
lasting changes.
AGOA Country ROWUSA
GSP
AGOA
MFN
Exports to ROW
Exports to USA
Exports
new exports
Exports
diverted exports from mfn to agoa
diverted exports from gsp to agoa
Exports diverted from ROW to agoa
Figure 5: Flow diagram for exports
Figure (5) summarises and links the compositional changes in exports to the USA
together with any diversion from exports from ROW. The directional arrows represent
exports by the beneficiary country while the looped arrows represent exports that are di-
verted due to the introduction of the agoa preference. Three separate theoretical views
have been reviewed in section (2.2). Although each approach has an essentially different
construction, there are interesting similarities. All three approaches for instance, rely on
price information which results in an increase in exports. For example, the constant
market share framework’s identity depends on relative prices. Allowing tariffs to affect
relative prices thereby yielding favourable prices for the agoa beneficiaries leads to in-
creased exports. A point which the preferential trade agreement literature shows that in
some cases leads to trade creation within a customs union. Finally, the motivation for
the matching approach presented above draws on these theories and although there is no
formal linkage—this is implicit in the results. The next section, throws more light on
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the econometric framework and data used in the paper.
3 Econometric Approach and Data
The matching approach is expected to provide a causal explanation to whatever increases
in exports of agoa countries is observed. Since one does not observe what the exports of
these countries would be after the enactment of agoa, countries that were not provided
these preferences are used as the counter–factual. The assumption is that these countries
provide the trend in exports that would have been observed for the preference benefi-
ciaries. Thus, after matching—an increase in exports of preference beneficiaries would
imply that the preferences have contributed to higher exports from the beneficiary coun-
tries. One can therefore attribute this difference, to their preferential status. However,
if there is no difference in exports, then the preferences might not have been the main
instrument in the export performance of the preferential beneficiaries. Matching is done
on similar economic, political, cultural and other factors in order to limit the influence
of these characteristics in driving the results.
Randomisation as noted by Lee (2005) is difficult to undertake. Observational data
or in this case data on countries are not randomised and thus treated and control groups
may vary significantly in terms of their characteristics. This difference can be removed
by the use of matching as argued in for example Lee (2005). Lee (2005) notes that the
outcome yi is uncorrelated with the treatment in cases of randomised experimental data.
This condition might hold if the treatment is exogenous and for reasons unrelated to yi
(Lee, 2005). Examples could be a new law or regulation or due to natural events for
example the weather or geography (Lee, 2005). Since the agoa policy was a new law,
this motivates the choice of approach here. As discussed in the literature on matching—
comparing groups of treated individuals and controls where there is no randomisation
leads to biases (Guo and Fraser, 2010, Lee, 2005, Rosenbaum, 1987, 1991a, 2002, 2004,
2010, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b).
Differences due to individual characteristics lead to overt bias and differences in
the unobservables () give rise to hidden (overt) biases (Lee, 2005). Overt and hidden
biases can affect the treatment effects. Guo and Fraser (2010) and Lee (2005) note that
overt biases can easily be controlled and removed by incorporating z covariates in the
estimation of the propensity score. On the other hand, hidden (covert) biases are more
difficult to remove and control for (Guo and Fraser, 2010, Lee, 2005). Overt biases occur
when E(y|X = 1) 6= E(y|X = 0) due to some differences in the z covariates while
differences in  leads to hidden biases (Guo and Fraser, 2010, Lee, 2005, Rosenbaum,
1987, 1991a, 2002, 2004, 2010).
As discussed in the literature on matching—comparing groups of treated individu-
als and controls where there is no randomisation leads to biases (Guo and Fraser, 2010,
Lee, 2005, Rosenbaum, 1987, 1991a, 2002, 2004, 2010, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b).
Some expected problems from the matching procedure include dimension problems—
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where the treated and controls differ in characteristics and common support problems—
where the treated and controls fail to overlap in their propensity scores (Lee, 2005).
Propensity score matching helps solve the dimension problem while the common sup-
port problem is solved by having the propensity score lie between zero and one (Guo
and Fraser, 2010, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b). These issues are further discussed on
page 19.
For my purposes, the treatment is the exogenous policy provided by the USA for
selected SSA countries. The agoa preference thus becomes the treatment. The response
of interest is the export performance of the beneficiaries in terms of their exports to the
USA, EU and ROW. I define this in various ways to test the sensitivity and robustness
of the outcomes and also allowing for the propositions outlined in section (2.2.3) to be
tested. The responses of interest in this case are:
1. Outcomes comparing exports by each beneficiary to three destinations—USA, rest
of the world (ROW) and EU. Using the previous definitions in section (2.2.3) total
exports is considered for three destinations as Xiworld =
∑k
i=1
∑j−2
i=1 X
i
ROW +∑k
i=1X
i
USA +
∑k
i=1X
i
EU
(a) Exports to the USA out of total exports for country i
(
XiUSA
Xi
world
)
(b) Exports to the ROW out of total exports for country i
(
XiROW
Xi
world
)
(c) Exports to the EU out of total exports for country i
(
XiEU
Xi
world
)
2. Outcomes comparing changes in the composition of exports to the USA. Here
exports to the USA (XUSA) is composed of gsp, no-programme (NP) and non-gsp
(NG): XiUSA =
∑k
i=1X
i
GSP +
∑k
i=1X
i
NG +
∑k
i=1X
i
NP
(a) GSP exports out of total exports to the USA for country i
(
XiGSP
XiUSA
)
(b) Non–Program exports to the USA out of total exports for each country i(
XiNP
XiUSA
)
(c) Non–GSP exports out of total exports for country i
(
XiNG
XiUSA
)
For ease of exposition, agoa exports are subsumed under non-gsp exports. The term
non-gsp is used to denote the residual exports after taking out gsp and no-programme
exports from total exports to the USA (that is, XiNG = X
i
USA −XiGSP −XiNP ). Do-
ing this makes the counter-factual comparable to the agoa countries. It is noted that,
for some countries in the Caribbean Basin, this would be a combination of two differ-
ent preferential programmes in some cases—for instance the Caribbean Basin Initiat-
ive (CBI) or Caribbean Basin Trade Protection Act (CBTPA). For other countries, this
would constitute exports under a free-trade agreement for example, the Central Amer-
ican countries and Dominican Republic. Additionally, special bilateral or multilateral
agreements in specific products might be captured here also—for example, Israel and
some countries in the Middle East. However, Israel and some Middle Eastern countries
with high income are excluded—thus, this does not pose a problem. And for a number
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of countries the residual would be zero. This does not diminish the analysis but allows
for a comparable quantity to be analysed.
In the analysis, I use mirror exports instead of reported exports for both items (1)
and (2) above. For item (1), the reason for using mirror exports is that these are recorded
more accurately than the exports reported by developing countries and these are obtained
from the UN–Comtrade database. In terms of the second item above, I resort to data
from United States International Trade Centre (USITC) which accurately reports the
various categories under which imports arrived in the USA. As a final check I use two
versions of the outcome in (1a). The data from UN-Comtrade and USITC are both used
to check the sensitivity and robustness of the results for exports to the USA.
I expect (1a) to show an increase while (1b) should unambiguously decrease. For
(1c) this could go in either direction depending on whether the decrease in (1b) ab-
sorbs all the increase in (1a). The fact that the EU is also a major partner of the agoa
beneficiaries and that, they also offer competing preferences makes the sign on (1b)
ambiguous a priori. For item (2), the sign of the outcome variable in sub-item (a) is
also ambiguous. However, the signs for (b) and (c) respectively are unambiguous. An
increase is expected for (c) while a decrease is expected for (b). These inferences are
made due to the earlier discussion in section (2.2). The econometric framework is now
discussed below.
τATE = E(τ) = E[y
1 − y0] (1)
τATT = E[τ |X = 1] = E[y1 − y0|X = 1] = E[y1|z,X = 1]− E[y0|z,X = 1] (2)
ˆP (z) = Pr(X = 1|z) (3)
agoa =
 1 if agoa beneficiary0 otherwise
τi,j = arg min |Pˆ 1i − Pˆ 0j | i ∈ T, j ∈ C (4)
Where: X is the agoa treatment, y is either the levels or shares of mirror exports
to the USA, EU or rest of the world (ROW) in the total mirror exports of country j
as well as the gsp, non–gsp and no programme import shares and levels by the USA
from country j and z - is a vector of variables used in estimating the propensity score
for matching agoa beneficiaries to non-agoa developing countries. This vector includes
economic variables, political variables, country characteristics and other variables such
as landlocked, physical capital per worker, land per worker among others. T and C are
treated and control country sets respectively. The t subscript is not shown in order not
to clutter the equations above and for ease of exposition.
Equation (1 & 2) define the problem at hand, I seek to find the difference between
the outcome variable before and after the treatment. However, it is difficult to ob-
serve E[y0|z,X = 1] — the counter-factual. Hence, the counter-factual is con-
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structed by selecting countries with characteristics similar to the treated countries —
E[y0|z,X = 1] = E[y0|z,X = 0]. The countries are matched based on the vector
z—allowing one to select countries that are very similar prior to the treatment. When
matching is done well it allows for a causal inference to be made (Yasar and Rejesus,
2005). This allows a comparison to be made and thus any difference in the outcome
variables can be attributed to the preference There are slight differences between the
ATT and ATE. The ATT estimate is preferred here since the agoa treatment is targeted
at SSA countries and its coverage does not extend beyond SSA. In cases where the
policy is targeted the ATT estimate provides an impact of the policy for the target group
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The vector y1 is the outcome variable for the treated
group (agoa beneficiaries) and y0 is that of the control group created (that is, the manu-
factured counter-factual for the agoa group of countries). Equation (3) is the propensity
score in general form estimated conditional on the vector of characteristics. This is
estimated via a logit regression and the predictions from this regression becomes the
propensity score used for matching agoa recipients to non-agoa countries. Equation (4)
specifies that treated countries with a propensity score ( ˆP (z)) close to a control country
are matched together—as they are similar, based on the covariates chosen.
In matching, it is often difficult obtaining a match. In order to avoid this problem,
one could match the propensity score using the nearest neighbour, caliper/radius, ker-
nel, and stratification matching methods. As is common in practise, a combination of
the various methods are employed. However, all methods are employed in the next sec-
tion allowing for the sensitivity and robustness of the estimates to be checked. In the
nearest neighbour matching, preference beneficiaries and non preference beneficiaries
are randomly ordered and the non preference beneficiaries with the score closest to the
beneficiary is selected. The nearest neighbour finds the nearest control country to match
with a treated country. Matching can be one-one or one-many, that is either one control
to each treated unit or more than one control to each treated unit. In addition, a control
can be matched to a treated unit more than once—matching with replacement (Caliendo
and Kopeinig, 2008, Guo and Fraser, 2010, Khandker et al., 2010).
The nearest neighbour matching estimated in the next session is done without re-
placement and a one-one nearest neighbour matching is performed. The nearest neigh-
bour (NN ) is given by
NN = min |Pˆ 1i − Pˆ 0j | i ∈ T, j ∈ C,
In addition, to using the propensity score with the nearest neighbour, the mahalanobis
metric matching (NNmaha) discussed at length in Abadie and Imbens (2002, 2011),
Abadie et al. (2001) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) is also included as a check on
the propensity score matching estimates. This estimator is a distance estimator and it
uses the covariance matrix COV of the matching variables to match the treated and
17
control countries.
NNmaha = (zi − zj)′COV −1(zi − zj) i ∈ T, j ∈ C,
The control country with the minimum distanceNNmaha is chosen for the treated coun-
try. Again, matching is done without replacement and both treated and control countries
matched are taken off after the match. Abadie and Imbens (2011), Abadie et al. (2001)
and Abadie and Imbens (2002) point out that one problem with this approach is that in
finite samples there is a bias of order Op(N−
1
k ) when continuous covariates are used
(where k is the number of continuous covariates). The bias results from the differences
in the continuous covariate values between treated and control groups (Abadie and Im-
bens, 2002, 2011, Abadie et al., 2001) The bias-corrected estimator reduces the bias but
does not entirely eliminate it thereby making it
√
N consistent (Abadie and Imbens,
2002, 2011). A bias of order Op(N−
1
6 ) to Op(N−
1
9 ) is expected in this analysis. The
use of the bias-correction based on the matching variables used in the regression would
be useful in reducing most of this bias.
The caliper/radius matching on the contrary, requires us to define a region of com-
mon support—(δ) and randomly select non preference beneficiaries that have a similar
propensity score within the defined region. This in a way improves on the quality of
matches obtained (Guo and Fraser, 2010, Lee, 2005). The nearest neighbour in some
cases can match treated and control countries that have very different propensity scores
(Guo and Fraser, 2010, Lee, 2005). The caliper, therefore provides the opportunity to
place a threshold on the difference in propensity scores between the treated and controls
that are matched (Guo and Fraser, 2010, Lee, 2005). I experiment with calipers in the
region of 0.05 and 0.01 to check the sensitivity of the results to the caliper chosen. The
caliper match is given as, δ > |Pˆ 1i − Pˆ 0j | = arg min |Pˆ 1i − Pˆ 0j | i ∈ T, j ∈ C, where
Pˆ 0i and Pˆ
1
j are the estimated propensity scores of the controls and treated respectively.
The caliper choice is informed by Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1985) suggestion for choos-
ing a caliper size that reduces a large percentage of the bias. According to Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1985), the suggested caliper size is given by 0.1×(s21/s20)×
√
[(s21 + s
2
0)/2]
where s21, s
2
0 are the sample variances for treated and control countries respectively.
Bandwidth parameters of 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 are used for the kernel estimator.
Again, varying the bandwidth allows one to check the sensitivity and robustness of the
kernel matching estimates to the size of the bandwidth. The kernel matching is given by
κ =
k
(
Pˆ 0j −Pˆ ji
an
)
∑
l∈C k
(
Pˆ 0
k
−Pˆ 1i
an
) j ∈ C, i ∈ T
k(·) is the kernel function. The Epanechnikov kernel is used in all kernel estimations
in the section 4. The kernel matching estimator uses a weighted average of the control
group of countries to construct each treated countries counter-factual.
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Last but not the least, the stratification matching allows the propensity score to be
divided into strata (or blocks/intervals). The mean difference between the treated and
control countries are then calculated within each strata (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008,
Khandker et al., 2010). After which, the overall weighted mean is calculated over all
strata to obtain the ATT estimate.
To strengthen the conclusions, a difference-in-difference matching estimation is also
done. This is possible since observations of the outcome variable before and after the
inception of agoa are available in the data. It is thus possible to use the difference in
outcomes to calculate the ATT estimate for the outcomes. This is given by
τDIDATT = E[∆y
1|X = 1, ˆP (z)]− E[∆y0|X = 0, ˆP (z)]
where ∆y1 = y1before − y1after and ∆y0 = y0before − y0after, y1before, y0before is the
average of outcomes in the period 1996–1999 and y1after, y
0
after is the average for the
period 2001–2011 (2001–2010 for UN Comtrade data on mirror exports to EU, USA
and ROW)
Equation (2) can be rewritten as
E[y1|X = 1, z]− E[y0|X = 0, z] = τATT + (E[y0|X = 1, z]− E[y0|X = 0, z])
To identify τATT within the framework the second term (in brackets) must be equal to
zero, that is E[y0|X = 1, z] − E[y0|X = 0, z] = 0. If E[y0|X = 1, z] − E[y0|X =
0, z] 6= 0, then the ATT estimate would be biased and due to differences in the treated
and control group of countries (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008)—leading to selection
bias. In order for the ATT estimate to be identified the following two assumptions
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983b) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008):
• Unconfoundedness: y0, y1∐X|z. The outcomes are assumed to be independent
of the agoa treatment after controlling for observed covariates. This assumption
is plausible since the policy is exogenous—the preference is extended to SSA
countries by the USA.
• Overlap: 0 < Pˆ (X = 1|z) < 1. The propensity score for the treated and
controls must lie between zero and one. In other words, their distributions must
have a considerable overlap.
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argue that in estimating τATT , the weaker versions of the
assumptions above can be used. Thus, unconfoundedness of the controls (y0
∐
X|z)
and the propensity score less than one (Pˆ (X = 1|z) < 1) are enough for identification
The presence of selection bias is a problem expected to be present in the analysis.
Controlling for the covariates in the propensity score estimate would solve the selection
bias that occurs due to covariate differences. On the other hand, the selectivity bias
arising from unobserved factors is more difficult to resolve and can still lead to highly
biased estimates. Using a difference-in-difference matching estimator is an attempt at
reducing the problem. However, the literature suggests carrying out sensitivity tests to
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check for problems with unobserved factors. Two of these tests are Rosenbaum’s bounds
analysis (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983a, Rosenbaum, 1987,
1991a, 2010, 2012) and Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini’s (2007) sensitivity design.
Ichino et al. (2006) tests are carried out in the text (Table 19) while Rosenbaum’s bounds
analysis is presented in the appendix (Tables 26 & 27).
Data is obtained from several sources. The World Development Indicators and IMFs
International Financial Statistics databases provide macroeconomic indicators (such as,
gross domestic product, inflation, population, value-added (in industry, manufacturing,
agriculture, construction, services, etc), interest rates, exchange rates among others)
for the purposes of matching similar countries. Additionally, Kaufmann’s Global Gov-
ernance1, Database of Political Institutions2, Polity IV and Bates et al (2005)3 databases
provide political, cultural and religious data to augment the vector of control variables
needed to perform a realistic match.
A panel of 35 treated countries from SSA and some 130 control countries (devel-
oping countries in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as North Africa) for
the years 1991 – 2010 (in some cases 2011 data where available is included for imports
by the USA) is employed in the study. After matching the number of control countries
included in the estimation drops to 26–40 countries. Table (2) shows the number of
treated and control countries falling within each block of the propensity score as well
as the overall number of treated and control countries matched. Nielsen and Sheffield
(2009) note that longitudinal data can create problems for matching—this is due to what
they call the, “double dimensionality of panel data”. They also discuss some of the
ways in which researchers have attempted to get around the problem. Matching is done
in three different ways based on the data available taking into account the concerns of
Nielsen and Sheffield (2009). The three approaches undertaken here allow us to check
the sensitivity and robustness of the results as well as get around the problem due to the
longitudinal nature of the data.
1. Pre-agoa controls and post-agoa outcomes are averaged and merged into one data-
set. The propensity score is then estimated on the pre-agoa control variables and
the matching is done based on the post-agoa outcomes.
2. A matched difference-in-difference is carried out. As mentioned earlier, to control
for unobserved factors as well as overcome any problems created by averaging the
data. The difference outcomes are constructed and merged with the pre-agoa con-
trol variables. After which, matching is carried out on the differenced outcomes.
3. Matching is done on an annual basis. The pre-agoa controls are merged with the
1www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
2Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. “New tools in
comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” 15:1, 165-176 (September), World
Bank Economic Review.
3Robert Bates ; Karen Feree; James Habyarimana; Macartan Humphreys ; Smita Singh, “Other Polit-
ical Data (updated 2005)”, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14977 UNF:5:XzsUmjt4AZzpm9JB3hO6pA== Mur-
ray Research Archive [Distributor] V1 [Version]
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panel formed for the outcome variables. The matching is then carried out for each
year for all countries within the common support region. The results here can
be averaged over the period to obtain a single estimate for the whole period to
compare with the estimates in (1) above.
In the estimation I exclude exports to USA and EU from exports to the world to
define the outcome for the rest of the world. The USA and EU are considered separately
here because for most preference beneficiaries these two countries account for 30% –
60% of their exports. In addition, this allows the effect on exports to the rest of the world
to be well determined. Nevertheless, one is then able to examine what is happening to
exports to two of their main export destinations. Moreover, reiterating a point made
earlier, it would be useful to see the effects on their exports to the EU given that agoa
beneficiaries receive competing preferences from the EU. However, it is not the intention
to study EU preferences in this paper but just to highlight what is happening to overall
exports to the EU in the presence of the agoa preferences.
4 Results
4.1 Choice of propensity score and balancing tests
Four propensity score models are estimated. Out of the four models 1 – 3 are chosen.
Model 1 is the main model used in the analysis, however, ATT estimates are presented
for models 2 and 3 to test the sensitivity of the estimates to the choice of covariates in
the propensity score model. The choice of model 1 is because all covariates are balanced
both within and outside the region of common support. Additionally, the model provides
the largest sample of the control countries on common support for the analysis. As
advocated in the literature, I include interactions and higher order terms to estimate
the propensity score (Guo and Fraser, 2010, Lee, 2005). Figure (6) plots the regions of
common support of the estimated propensity score. Sub-figures (a) – (d) show the graphs
of models (1) – (4) respectively. A sizeable chunk of the control countries fall outside
the common support area. However, I do get a considerable number (26–40 countries)
falling within the common support area. In addition, all the treated countries (with
the exception of model 4) lie within the common support area. All preliminary checks
on the propensity score indicate a good balance between the controls and the treated
countries. All four models pass the balancing of the covariates in the optimally selected
blocks of propensity score. Table (2) shows the optimal number of blocks—apart from
model 2 which has five blocks, the remaining models have six blocks of the propensity
score. Further balancing tests following DiPrete and Gangl (2004), Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1985) are performed on the covariates used in estimating the various propensity
score models. Table (3) reports the two-tailed T-test results and the bias reductions in
the covariates before and after matching.
Model 1 has all covariates balanced and shows significant reduction in the bias of
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the covariates prior to balancing. Regulatory quality proves to be problematic for the
remaining models—it rejects the null hypothesis of equal means after matching. This
indicates that the treated and control countries differ in their regulatory quality. It must
be noted that the covariate balancing tests conducted in this table is for all countries and
thus includes countries outside the common support region. However, the test is passed
when only control countries falling within the common support are used. In addition,
the variable was balanced each block of the propensity score under common support.
Finally, in Figure (6) model 1 displays fewer control observations in the tails com-
pared to the other models. In addition, fewer gaps exist within the matched units within
the common support region of the propensity score.
Table 1: Logit estimates for propensity score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Landlocked 0.388 0.571 0.531 1.228
(0.638) (0.720) (0.724) (0.910)
Low Income (LI) 93.80 160.9+ 159.0+
(59.788) (90.161) (91.307)
Lower Middle Income (LMI) 77.84∗ 103.7+ 102.7+ -55.53
(37.526) (54.823) (55.510) (49.924)
Majority Christian 0.871 -15.35+ -25.01∗
(0.745) (8.404) (11.011)
Majority Muslim 0.478 15.45+
(0.736) (8.413)
Weighted distance (log) 36.84 44.55 34.78 18.42
(42.365) (54.878) (56.139) (66.966)
Distance Squared (log) -1.930 -2.334 -1.797 -0.821
(2.322) (2.997) (3.068) (3.665)
LI× Real GDP 36.46+ 64.14+ 64.37+ 72.27+
(20.676) (33.671) (34.203) (40.116)
LMI× Real GDP 38.90 72.77+ 72.85+ 80.73+
(24.152) (39.195) (39.785) (46.739)
UMI× Real GDP 48.77+ 85.76+ 85.71+ 95.68+
(28.390) (45.407) (46.077) (54.061)
Real GDP Squared -2.838+ -5.191+ -5.202+ -5.758+
(1.632) (2.680) (2.722) (3.200)
Agric land % of land area 2.085 2.266 1.904
(1.525) (1.553) (1.946)
Other Religion 0.339 -15.07+ -24.56∗
(0.931) (8.282) (10.872)
Corruption -3.298 -3.307 -0.371
(4.410) (4.478) (3.203)
Voice & Accountability -2.465 -2.688 -4.409
(2.144) (2.192) (2.742)
Regulatory Quality 0.932 0.854 0.647
(2.323) (2.360) (2.851)
LI× Corruption 2.283 2.093
(4.483) (4.551)
LMI× Corruption -1.610 -1.620 -2.311
(4.721) (4.794) (5.185)
Political Stability 0.988 1.566 2.291
(1.781) (2.056) (2.236)
Muslim× Real GDP -2.154+ -2.140+ -3.407∗
(1.168) (1.166) (1.522)
GDP per capita (log) 2.732∗ 2.845∗ 2.384
(1.280) (1.316) (1.507)
Area (log) 0.109 0.0296
(0.186) (0.221)
Upper Middle Income (UMI) -171.8
(106.901)
UMI× Corruption -4.246
(5.510)
Adj. Saving per GNI -6.681
(4.855)
Constant -386.5+ -586.1+ -527.6 -315.7
(228.386) (322.308) (327.326) (328.594)
Observations 111 104 104 91
Chi-square 40.59 52.73 53.08 54.46
Log likelihood -48.89 -40.06 -39.89 -32.37
Pseudo-R square 0.293 0.397 0.400 0.457
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation results for the propensity score regressions. Dependent variable is the AGOA
treatment. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2: Number of Controls and Treated under common support for the four
estimated models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Non-agoa agoa Total Non-agoa agoa Total Non-agoa agoa Total Non-agoa agoa Total
1 2 1 3 - - - 1 1 2 2 1 3
2 15 3 18 7 5 12 8 4 12 5 3 8
3 8 6 14 8 8 16 8 6 14 4 4 8
4 6 10 16 6 8 14 5 9 14 6 6 12
5 6 8 14 4 5 9 4 7 11 4 9 13
6 3 7 10 1 9 10 1 8 9 0 10 10
Total 40 35 75 26 35 61 27 35 62 21 33 54
Table 3: Main Text: Covariate Balancing Tests (All Models)
Variable Sample Control (Mean) Treated (Mean) % bias % bias reduction T-test (P-Value)
Model 1
landlocked Matched .486 .343 -34.261 32.384 -1.067 (.855 )
landlocked UnMatched .132 .343 50.67 -2.653 (.009)
Low Income (LI) Matched .571 .486 -18.944 71.571 -.627 (.733 )
Low Income (LI) UnMatched .184 .486 66.638 -3.432 (.001)
Lower Middle Income (LMI) Matched .314 .371 11.576 -15.152 .439 (.331 )
Lower Middle Income (LMI) UnMatched .421 .371 -10.053 .491 (.625)
Upper Middle Income (UMI) Matched .114 .143 6.659 88.657 .311 (.378 )
Upper Middle Income (UMI) UnMatched .395 .143 -58.707 2.717 (.008)
Majority Christian Matched .314 .4 17.184 43.842 .654 (.258 )
Majority Christian UnMatched .553 .4 -30.6 1.496 (.138)
Majority Muslim Matched .371 .371 0 100 0 (.5 )
Majority Muslim UnMatched .263 .371 23.167 -1.156 (.25)
Other Religion Matched .314 .229 -20.981 -93.22 -.705 (.758 )
Other Religion UnMatched .184 .229 10.859 -.541 (.59)
Weighted distance (log) Matched 9.391 9.334 -13.714 82.129 -1.022 (.844 )
Weighted distance (log) UnMatched 9.015 9.334 76.74 -3.353 (.001)
Real GDP (log) Matched 7.035 7.083 5.364 94.87 .221 (.413 )
Real GDP (log) UnMatched 8.012 7.083 -104.555 5.002 (0)
Distance Squared (log) Matched 88.228 87.186 -14.102 81.464 -1.009 (.841 )
Distance Squared (log) UnMatched 81.562 87.186 76.078 -3.339 (.001)
LI× Real GDP Matched 3.715 3.142 -19.448 70.472 -.645 (.739 )
LI× Real GDP UnMatched 1.202 3.142 65.864 -3.384 (.001)
LMI× Real GDP Matched 2.35 2.7 9.283 45.112 .364 (.359 )
LMI× Real GDP UnMatched 3.337 2.7 -16.913 .813 (.418)
UMI× Real GDP Matched .97 1.241 7.193 87.872 .342 (.367 )
UMI× Real GDP UnMatched 3.473 1.241 -59.305 2.739 (.007)
Real GDP Squared Matched 50.05 50.835 5.795 94.482 .247 (.403 )
Real GDP Squared UnMatched 65.076 50.835 -105.013 4.995 (0)
Model 2
Agric land % of land area Matched .406 .472 32.603 36.116 1.09 (.14 )
Agric land % of land area UnMatched .368 .472 51.035 -2.418 (.017)
landlocked Matched .486 .343 -34.261 32.384 -1.067 (.855 )
landlocked UnMatched .132 .343 50.67 -2.653 (.009)
Low Income (LI) Matched .571 .486 -18.944 71.571 -.627 (.733 )
Low Income (LI) UnMatched .184 .486 66.638 -3.432 (.001)
Lower Middle Income (LMI) Matched .314 .371 11.576 -15.152 .439 (.331 )
Lower Middle Income (LMI) UnMatched .421 .371 -10.053 .491 (.625)
Upper Middle Income (UMI) Matched .114 .143 6.659 88.657 .311 (.378 )
Upper Middle Income (UMI) UnMatched .395 .143 -58.707 2.717 (.008)
Majority Christian Matched .314 .4 17.184 43.842 .654 (.258 )
Majority Christian UnMatched .553 .4 -30.6 1.496 (.138)
Majority Muslim Matched .371 .371 0 100 0 (.5 )
Majority Muslim UnMatched .263 .371 23.167 -1.156 (.25)
Other Religion Matched .314 .229 -20.981 -93.22 -.705 (.758 )
Other Religion UnMatched .184 .229 10.859 -.541 (.59)
Weighted distance (log) Matched 9.391 9.334 -13.714 82.129 -1.022 (.844 )
Weighted distance (log) UnMatched 9.015 9.334 76.74 -3.353 (.001)
Real GDP (log) Matched 7.035 7.083 5.364 94.87 .221 (.413 )
Real GDP (log) UnMatched 8.012 7.083 -104.555 5.002 (0)
Corruption Matched .289 .354 30.402 -9.498 1.16 (.126 )
Corruption UnMatched .413 .354 -27.765 1.362 (.176)
Voice & Accountability Matched .305 .329 10.429 79.571 .41 (.342 )
Voice & Accountability UnMatched .446 .329 -51.051 2.415 (.017)
Regulatory Quality Matched .228 .324 47.276 -20.719 2.058 (.022 )
Regulatory Quality UnMatched .404 .324 -39.162 1.813 (.073)
Distance Squared (log) Matched 88.228 87.186 -14.102 81.464 -1.009 (.841 )
Distance Squared (log) UnMatched 81.562 87.186 76.078 -3.339 (.001)
LI× Real GDP Matched 3.715 3.142 -19.448 70.472 -.645 (.739 )
LI× Real GDP UnMatched 1.202 3.142 65.864 -3.384 (.001)
Model 3
Agric land % of land area Matched .406 .472 32.603 36.116 1.09 (.14 )
Agric land % of land area UnMatched .368 .472 51.035 -2.418 (.017)
landlocked Matched .486 .343 -34.261 32.384 -1.067 (.855 )
landlocked UnMatched .132 .343 50.67 -2.653 (.009)
Low Income (LI) Matched .571 .486 -18.944 71.571 -.627 (.733 )
Low Income (LI) UnMatched .184 .486 66.638 -3.432 (.001)
Lower Middle Income (LMI) Matched .314 .371 11.576 -15.152 .439 (.331 )
Lower Middle Income (LMI) UnMatched .421 .371 -10.053 .491 (.625)
Upper Middle Income (UMI) Matched .114 .143 6.659 88.657 .311 (.378 )
Upper Middle Income (UMI) UnMatched .395 .143 -58.707 2.717 (.008)
Majority Christian Matched .314 .4 17.184 43.842 .654 (.258 )
Majority Christian UnMatched .553 .4 -30.6 1.496 (.138)
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Majority Muslim Matched .371 .371 0 100 0 (.5 )
Majority Muslim UnMatched .263 .371 23.167 -1.156 (.25)
Other Religion Matched .314 .229 -20.981 -93.22 -.705 (.758 )
Other Religion UnMatched .184 .229 10.859 -.541 (.59)
Weighted distance (log) Matched 9.391 9.334 -13.714 82.129 -1.022 (.844 )
Weighted distance (log) UnMatched 9.015 9.334 76.74 -3.353 (.001)
Real GDP (log) Matched 7.035 7.083 5.364 94.87 .221 (.413 )
Real GDP (log) UnMatched 8.012 7.083 -104.555 5.002 (0)
Area (log) Matched 12.108 12.36 10.752 78.856 .51 (.306 )
Area (log) UnMatched 11.169 12.36 50.849 -2.317 (.022)
Corruption Matched .289 .354 30.402 -9.498 1.16 (.126 )
Corruption UnMatched .413 .354 -27.765 1.362 (.176)
Voice & Accountability Matched .305 .329 10.429 79.571 .41 (.342 )
Voice & Accountability UnMatched .446 .329 -51.051 2.415 (.017)
Regulatory Quality Matched .228 .324 47.276 -20.719 2.058 (.022 )
Regulatory Quality UnMatched .404 .324 -39.162 1.813 (.073)
Distance Squared (log) Matched 88.228 87.186 -14.102 81.464 -1.009 (.841 )
Distance Squared (log) UnMatched 81.562 87.186 76.078 -3.339 (.001)
Model 4
Agric land % of land area Matched .406 .472 32.603 36.116 1.09 (.14 )
Agric land % of land area UnMatched .368 .472 51.035 -2.418 (.017)
landlocked Matched .486 .343 -34.261 32.384 -1.067 (.855 )
landlocked UnMatched .132 .343 50.67 -2.653 (.009)
Low Income (LI) Matched .571 .486 -18.944 71.571 -.627 (.733 )
Low Income (LI) UnMatched .184 .486 66.638 -3.432 (.001)
Lower Middle Income (LMI) Matched .314 .371 11.576 -15.152 .439 (.331 )
Lower Middle Income (LMI) UnMatched .421 .371 -10.053 .491 (.625)
Upper Middle Income (UMI) Matched .114 .143 6.659 88.657 .311 (.378 )
Upper Middle Income (UMI) UnMatched .395 .143 -58.707 2.717 (.008)
Majority Christian Matched .314 .4 17.184 43.842 .654 (.258 )
Majority Christian UnMatched .553 .4 -30.6 1.496 (.138)
Majority Muslim Matched .371 .371 0 100 0 (.5 )
Majority Muslim UnMatched .263 .371 23.167 -1.156 (.25)
Other Religion Matched .314 .229 -20.981 -93.22 -.705 (.758 )
Other Religion UnMatched .184 .229 10.859 -.541 (.59)
Weighted distance (log) Matched 9.391 9.334 -13.714 82.129 -1.022 (.844 )
Weighted distance (log) UnMatched 9.015 9.334 76.74 -3.353 (.001)
Real GDP (log) Matched 7.035 7.083 5.364 94.87 .221 (.413 )
Real GDP (log) UnMatched 8.012 7.083 -104.555 5.002 (0)
Area (log) Matched 12.108 12.36 10.752 78.856 .51 (.306 )
Area (log) UnMatched 11.169 12.36 50.849 -2.317 (.022)
Corruption Matched .289 .354 30.402 -9.498 1.16 (.126 )
Corruption UnMatched .413 .354 -27.765 1.362 (.176)
Voice & Accountability Matched .305 .329 10.429 79.571 .41 (.342 )
Voice & Accountability UnMatched .446 .329 -51.051 2.415 (.017)
Regulatory Quality Matched .228 .324 47.276 -20.719 2.058 (.022 )
Regulatory Quality UnMatched .404 .324 -39.162 1.813 (.073)
Distance Squared (log) Matched 88.228 87.186 -14.102 81.464 -1.009 (.841 )
Distance Squared (log) UnMatched 81.562 87.186 76.078 -3.339 (.001)
The bias and bias reductions are based on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The standardised difference is calculated as 100(X¯T −
X¯C)/
√
(S2
T
+ S2
C
)/2, where X¯T andX¯C are the sample means for each covariate in the treated (T ) and control (C) groups, S
are their respective sample variances. The sample percent bias reduction for covariate is 100 × (1 − bmatch/bpre), where bmatch
and bpre are the treated and control post- and pre-match differences in means respectively.
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(a) Model 1 (b) Model 2
(c) Model 3 (d) Model 4
Figure 6: Propensity score and region of common support
4.2 Outcome in Levels and Shares
Tables (4–6) report the initial results for the various import regimes of the USA. The
three regimes are the no programme, gsp and non–gsp regimes which are available to the
developing countries in the dataset. The outcomes are presented in levels and in share of
total imports by the USA from each country. The no programme item represents imports
entering the USA that are not recorded under either the gsp or any other preference.
These are mostly imports that enter the USA and receive the most favoured nation (mfn)
treatment—(normal tariffs that apply to all World Trade Organisation (WTO) member
countries.) For the remaining outcomes, gsp represents imports entering the USA that
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had gsp tariffs applied on them, while non-gsp represents the residual which would be
a proxy for the agoa imports of the treated. The three tables differ only in terms of the
base propensity score model applied in matching. Tables (4), (5) and (6) are based on
models 1, 2 and 3 respectively (see table 1).
The results for the levels in all three tables yield only a few significant estimates
for no programme while tables (5 & 6) provide significant results for non–gsp imports
in a few cases. The results for the shares fare much better than the levels. The gsp
shares are not significant in any of the tables. Tables (4 & 6) have all no programme and
non–gsp shares yielding highly significant estimates for the various matching estimators
presented. The no programme share estimates for the kernel (bandwidth=0.005) and
radius (δ = 0.01) are no longer significant in table (5). The ATT estimates presented for
the no programme and non–gsp shares are consistent in terms of their significance and
signs across the matching estimators in each table as well as across the three tables (with
two exceptions in table (5) where no programme shares are no longer significant but the
signs remain the same). Differences in the estimates across tables is expected given that
models 2 and 3 have more control and treated countries in the tails and gaps within the
common support region. this would then create differences in the number of countries
matched to the treated—this have an impact on the estimates. On the contrary, the
estimates are relatively similar. For instance, the range of estimates across the estimators
is 18.8% (kernel, bandwidth=0.005) – 20.2% (radius, δ = 0.01) for agoa shares in
table (4). That of table (5 & 6) are 13.7% (kernel, bandwidth=0.005) – 21.1% (radius,
δ = 0.05) and 14.% (kernel, bandwidth=0.01) – 20.6% (radius, δ = 0.005) respectively.
Similarly, the range for no programme shares are 20.7% (radius, δ = 0.05) – 25%
(kernel, bandwidth=0.005); 10.9% (kernel, bandwidth=0.01) – 20.6% (stratification);
and 14.3% (kernel, bandwidth=0.01) – 20.2% (stratification) respectively. There are
some differences for the levels for some estimates, however, these estimates are mostly
not significant in all tables. The estimates presented in tables (5) and (6) are much closer
to each other than they are to the estimates in table (4).
The results show that, on average and ceteris paribus, the shares of agoa imports by
the USA from beneficiaries increased by about 13.7% – 21.1% relative to the control
countries. Their no programme shares on the other hand, decreased by approximately
10.9% – 25% relative to the control countries, on average and ceteris paribus. The res-
ults are consistent with the empirical literature that point towards an increase in agoa
exports. In terms of the levels, the cases that were significant are consistent with the
results of the shares. On average and ceteris paribus, no programme import levels de-
clined in all three tables by US$ 1,349 – 1,384 million (table 4); US$ 1,253 million
(table 5) and US$ 1,284 – 3,358 million (table 6). The declines are relative to the con-
trol countries. On the contrary, non–gsp import levels increased on average and ceteris
paribus by US$ 395 million (table 5) to US$ 418 million (table 6) relative to the control
countries.
The decline in no programme levels are about 217% – 697% higher in magnitude
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than the non–gsp level imports. The greater decline in no programme imports might
indicate some marginal increases in the gsp shares. the gsp shares reported in the tables
are positive in most cases with the maximum reported increase at 4.8%. The non sig-
nificance of the gsp might there be be due to the strong decline in no programme levels
which translated into higher gsp shares for the agoa beneficiaries relative to the con-
trol countries. The channel through which this occurs thereby presents the insignificant
estimates (had there been a higher import level of gsp it might have translated into sig-
nificant estimates). The results for the non–gsp shares (and by implication agoa for the
beneficiaries) and no programme shares are beyond doubt and point towards a restructur-
ing of exports of beneficiaries away from their no programme exports. At this point, not
much can be said about whether overall exports to the USA by beneficiaries increased
relative to the counter-factual. the next table would be useful in providing answers to
this question. On a minor point, should the results point towards an increased in exports
to the USA then an implication of the result would mean gsp shares must have gone up
relative to the control. Another implication would be that there may be some differences
in unobserved factors between the treated and control countries that are driving the in-
significant results for the gsp levels and shares. This is however, doubtful at this point
and the sensitivity analysis presented in section (4.6) some answers to the issue of the
presence of unobserved factors.
Table (7) shows the results for mirror exports to the EU, USA and ROW. These are
based on total exports to each destination. Again, results for the levels and shares are
reported. The estimations, are restricted to propensity scores based on models 1 and
2. The reason being that, the propensity scores based on models 2 and 3 yielded very
similar results and hence, focussing on models 1 and 2 in this section does not take
anything away from the analysis.
The results for the levels yield one significant estimate for ROW under the stratific-
ation matching approach for both models. The estimated coefficient shows on average
and ceteris paribus, that mirror exports to ROW declined between US$ 6,814 and US$
7,887 million relative to the control. The mirror exports to the remaining destinations
were not significant in any of the columns. The shares report more significant estimates
compared to the levels. For the share of mirror exports to ROW, there was a decline
ranging from 12.4% – 12.8% relative to the control countries, on average and ceteris
paribus. The only other significant estimate is an increase in the share of mirror exports
to the EU of 8.8% relative to the controls, on average and ceteris paribus.
Model 2 in the same table, shows higher estimates and the shares for EU and ROW
are significant in all three columns. The share for the EU are 13.3% – 16.7% higher for
the treated relative to the controls, holding all else constant. Consistent with the estim-
ates based on model 1, the shares to ROW decline for the treated relative to the controls
by 18.7% – 22.6%, on average and ceteris paribus. All results presented in this section
so far, are consistent with the earlier propositions set in section (2.2.3). On the contrary,
the results show that EU exports did not suffer as a result of the agoa preference—any
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changes might be relative and marginal. Although, the estimated effect for the USA
share is poistive, they are not significant and this is worrying. The level results are all
negative, however, the estimates for ROW and EU are much larger compared to the
USA levels. This does not present much of a problem. The relative level of the declines
are responsible for the positive increase in shares reported for the EU. The ROW levels
are in most cases 2.8 – 3.3 times the value of the EU estimates. Given this, one would
have expected a significant and positive estimate for the USA shares. The non signific-
ance might there be attributable to the presence of unobserved factors that might have
explained away the effect.
One point of note is that, the two sources of data used for the USA level outcome
yield similar estimates. Thus, any problems arising from the data source can be dis-
counted. This in itself yields a robustness check of the main USA outcome variable
obtained from the US International Trade Centre. In addition, although the presence of
unobserved factors are suspected, the fact that the estimated ATT is not zero in value
leads one to place a lower emphasis on unobserved factors as a major problem here.
The remaining analysis in this section and the next sections (4.3 – 4.6) are an attempt
to use other methods, outcome variables and sensitivity analysis to check the robustness
of the results presented here. In addition, it is to verify whether the results that were not
significant improve. Nevertheless, it would allow for the significant results that remain
significant to show that the effects reported are beyond doubt. The discussion of the
results based on covariate matching is presented next.
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Table 4: Cross-Section Estimates (Model 1)
Matching Type Outcome No. Contr. No. Treat ATT Est. Std. Error T-stat
Outcome in Levels
Kernel–bw=0.06 No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -1349162496.00 861946225.31 -1.565
Kernel–bw=0.06 GSP Preference 40 35 -66442312.00 142035881.78 -.468
Kernel–bw=0.06 Non–GSP Preference 40 35 392376832.00 312524273.13 1.256
Kernel–bw=0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -639962240.00 1007778274.14 -.635
Kernel–bw=0.01 GSP Preference 40 35 -4960465.50 228553545.77 -.022
Kernel–bw=0.01 Non–GSP Preference 40 35 601407552.00 468640451.92 1.283
Kernel–bw=0.005 No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -172533392.00 1419980284.80 -.122
Kernel–bw=0.005 GSP Preference 40 35 20342028.00 429618054.83 .047
Kernel–bw=0.005 Non–GSP Preference 40 35 808071872.00 895763433.14 .902
Stratification No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -1384507520.00 994934462.78 -1.392
Stratification GSP Preference 40 35 -147136608.00 225022794.88 -.654
Stratification Non–GSP Preference 40 35 396514464.00 312551905.55 1.269
Radius–0.05 No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -963799622.85 824879821.12 -1.168
Radius–0.05 GSP Preference 35 35 32994945.21 104546135.11 .316
Radius–0.05 Non–GSP Preference 40 35 395611503.80 336369150.44 1.176
Radius–0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -664691229.78 931259662.82 -.714
Radius–0.01 GSP Preference 35 35 -48386735.76 232331604.45 -.208
Radius–0.01 Non–GSP Preference 40 35 573861309.95 538114133.05 1.066
Country’s Share in total USA imports
Kernel–bw=0.06 No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -.215 .046 -4.645
Kernel–bw=0.06 GSP Preference 40 35 .014 .032 .440
Kernel–bw=0.06 Non–GSP Preference 40 35 .192 .041 4.72
Kernel–bw=0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -.246 .078 -3.142
Kernel–bw=0.01 GSP Preference 40 35 .037 .058 .638
Kernel–bw=0.01 Non–GSP Preference 40 35 .190 .058 3.254
Kernel–bw=0.005 No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -.250 .128 -1.946
Kernel–bw=0.005 GSP Preference 40 35 .048 .086 .557
Kernel–bw=0.005 Non–GSP Preference 40 35 .188 .100 1.890
Stratification No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -.213 .052 -4.114
Stratification GSP Preference 40 35 .0067 .034 .196
Stratification Non–GSP Preference 40 35 .195 .041 4.810
Radius–0.05 No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -.208 .056 -3.714
Radius–0.05 GSP Preference 35 35 .007 .042 .167
Radius–0.05 Non–GSP Preference 40 35 .187 .045 4.156
Radius–0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 40 35 -.249 .077 -3.234
Radius–0.01 GSP Preference 35 35 .017 .057 .298
Radius–0.01 Non–GSP Preference 40 35 .202 .058 3.483
All standard errors bootstrapped with 250 replications. For the radius estimates Z values are reported instead of T-statistics. Critical valuesZ(α = 0.05) = 1.96;Z(α = 0.1) =
1.64; t60,0.1 = 1.296; t60,0.05 = 1.671; t75,0.1 = 1.293; t75,0.05 = 1.666. Covariates used in matching include proxies for governance (corruption), economic
structure, gravity type variables
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Table 5: Cross-Section Estimates–Level Imports (Model 2)
Matching Type Outcome No. Contr. No. Treat ATT Est. Std. Error T-stat
Outcome in Levels
Kernel–bw=0.06 No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -1253373952.00 893357213.03 -1.403
Kernel–bw=0.06 GSP Preference 26 35 -200394688.00 199274355.28 -1.006
Kernel–bw=0.06 Non–GSP Preference 26 35 413053184.00 314779296.65 1.312
Kernel–bw=0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -2620337152.00 2450153227.97 -1.069
Kernel–bw=0.01 GSP Preference 26 35 -318943136.00 578883183.67 -.551
Kernel–bw=0.01 Non–GSP Preference 26 35 142069088.00 317803029.63 .447
Kernel–bw=0.005 No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -2734660608.00 2352334630.07 -1.163
Kernel–bw=0.005 GSP Preference 26 35 -565035904.00 499041958.20 -1.132
Kernel–bw=0.005 Non–GSP Preference 26 35 -134012400.00 230289891.18 -.582
Stratification No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -1511461120.00 1148903128.40 -1.316
Stratification GSP Preference 26 35 -214117248.00 219969658.24 -.973
Stratification Non–GSP Preference 26 35 395676512.00 272240318.37 1.453
Radius–0.05 No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -1517723016.84 1214664025.91 -1.25
Radius–0.05 GSP Preference 24 35 -207928134.87 241181176.03 -.862
Radius–0.05 Non–GSP Preference 26 35 341247932.11 349208851.81 .977
Radius–0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -2404234594.02 2135859647.20 -1.126
Radius–0.01 GSP Preference 24 35 -275557298.70 541158902.17 -.509
Radius–0.01 Non–GSP Preference 26 35 117560935.79 296438970.97 .397
Country’s Share in total USA imports
Kernel–bandwidth=0.06 No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -.175 .086 -2.047
Kernel–bandwidth=0.06 GSP Preference 26 35 -.033 .064 -.509
Kernel–bandwidth=0.06 Non–GSP Preference 26 35 .203 .042 4.827
Kernel–bandwidth=0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -.155 .098 -1.581
Kernel–bandwidth=0.01 GSP Preference 26 35 .007 .081 .09
Kernel–bandwidth=0.01 Non–GSP Preference 26 35 .146 .072 2.032
Kernel–bandwidth=0.005 No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -.109 .104 -1.056
Kernel–bandwidth=0.005 GSP Preference 26 35 -.032 .081 -.393
Kernel–bandwidth=0.005 Non–GSP Preference 26 35 .137 .08 1.711
Stratification No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -.206 .062 -3.298
Stratification GSP Preference 26 35 .0018 .039 .047
Stratification Non–GSP Preference 26 35 .200 .045 4.426
Radius–0.05 No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -.197 .078 -2.526
Radius–0.05 GSP Preference 24 35 -.014 .055 -.255
Radius–0.05 Non–GSP Preference 26 35 .211 .051 4.137
Radius–0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 26 35 -.146 .097 -1.505
Radius–0.01 GSP Preference 24 35 .016 .081 .198
Radius–0.01 Non–GSP Preference 26 35 .145 .072 2.014
All standard errors bootstrapped with 250 replications. For the radius estimates Z values are reported instead of T-statistics. Critical valuesZ(α = 0.05) = 1.96;Z(α = 0.1) =
1.64; t60,0.1 = 1.296; t60,0.05 = 1.671; t75,0.1 = 1.293; t75,0.05 = 1.666. Covariates used in matching include proxies for governance (corruption), economic
structure, gravity type variables
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Table 6: Cross-Section Estimates–Levels (Model 3)
Matching Type Outcome No. Contr. No. Treat ATT Est. Std. Error T-stat
Outcome in Levels
Kernel–bw=0.06 No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -1284815616.00 857828362.93 -1.498
Kernel–bw=0.06 GSP Preference 27 35 -195441104.00 192819724.62 -1.014
Kernel–bw=0.06 Non–GSP Preference 27 35 418223872.00 298376258.58 1.402
Kernel–bw=0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -3150746368.00 2081949562.55 -1.513
Kernel–bw=0.01 GSP Preference 27 35 -571329792.00 502442486.46 -1.137
Kernel–bw=0.01 Non–GSP Preference 27 35 -125417368.00 168687287.85 -.743
Kernel–bw=0.005 No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -2188557056.00 2819673251.68 -.776
Kernel–bw=0.005 GSP Preference 27 35 -582676736.00 622929534.17 -.935
Kernel–bw=0.005 Non–GSP Preference 27 35 43588328.00 126195746.81 .345
Stratification No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -1069254912.00 988352857.52 -1.082
Stratification GSP Preference 27 35 -146493936.00 198938977.95 -.736
Stratification Non–GSP Preference 27 35 415805888.00 287932620.99 1.444
Radius–0.05 No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -1293825193.00 1057511850.46 -1.223
Radius–0.05 GSP Preference 25 35 -172692903.98 229076999.06 -.754
Radius–0.05 Non–GSP Preference 27 35 358852934.77 363761861.78 .99
Radius–0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -3358353353.22 1911908368.43 -1.757
Radius–0.01 GSP Preference 25 35 -597451014.92 463326272.86 -1.289
Radius–0.01 Non–GSP Preference 27 35 -108282609.67 211904725.63 -.511
Country’s Share in total USA imports
Kernel–bandwidth=0.06 No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -.170 .082 -2.078
Kernel–bandwidth=0.06 GSP Preference 27 35 -.038 .075 -.51
Kernel–bandwidth=0.06 Non–GSP Preference 27 35 .203 .043 4.675
Kernel–bandwidth=0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -.143 .091 -1.569
Kernel–bandwidth=0.01 GSP Preference 27 35 -.029 .037 -.788
Kernel–bandwidth=0.01 Non–GSP Preference 27 35 .142 .073 1.942
Kernel–bandwidth=0.005 No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -.188 .116 -1.619
Kernel–bandwidth=0.005 GSP Preference 27 35 -.060 .058 -1.031
Kernel–bandwidth=0.005 Non–GSP Preference 27 35 .187 .07 2.651
Stratification No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -.202 .067 -3.015
Stratification GSP Preference 27 35 -.004 .046 -.094
Stratification Non–GSP Preference 27 35 .202 .051 3.964
Radius–0.05 No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -.2 .065 -3.077
Radius–0.05 GSP Preference 25 35 -.005 .05 -.1
Radius–0.05 Non–GSP Preference 27 35 .206 .051 4.039
Radius–0.01 No programme (MFN tariff) 27 35 -.148 .086 -1.721
Radius–0.01 GSP Preference 25 35 -.036 .036 -1
Radius–0.01 Non–GSP Preference 27 35 .147 .07 2.1
All standard errors bootstrapped with 250 replications. For the radius estimates Z values are reported instead of T-statistics. Critical valuesZ(α = 0.05) = 1.96;Z(α = 0.1) =
1.64; t60,0.1 = 1.296; t60,0.05 = 1.671; t75,0.1 = 1.293; t75,0.05 = 1.666. Covariates used in matching include proxies for governance (corruption), economic
structure, gravity type variables
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Table 7: Cross-section results for Mirror Exports to the EU, USA, ROW (Models 1 & 2)
Variable N [NT (NC)] Kernal (bw=0.06) Radius (δ = 0.05) Stratification
Model 1—Total Mirror Exports in Levels
EU 75 [35 (40)] -1.481e+09 (1.282e+09) [-1.155] -1.356e+09 (1.272e+09) [-1.066] -2.189e+09 (1.749e+09) [-1.252]
USA 75 [35 (40)] -5.928e+08 (1.083e+09) [-.547] -5.550e+08 (1.096e+09) [-.506] -1.157e+09 (1.278e+09) [-.905]
ROW 75 [35 (40)] -4.848e+09 (3.007e+09) [-1.612] -4.690e+09 (3.218e+09) [-1.458] -6.814e+09 (4.109e+09) [-1.658]
USA Imports 75 [35 (40)] -5.446e+08 (1.043e+09) [-.522] -5.107e+08 (1.061e+09) [-.481] -1.093e+09 (1.232e+09) [-.887]
Model 1—Mirror Exports, Shares
EU 75 [35 (40)] .09 (.062) [1.447] .094 (.063) [1.495] .088 (.067) [1.3148]
USA 75 [35 (40)] .033 (.042) [.792] .034 (.043) [.799] .038 (.044) [.8702]
ROW 75 [35 (40)] -.124 (.065) [-1.896] -.128 (.066) [-1.944] -.127 (.069) [-1.825]
Model 2—Total Mirror Exports in Levels
EU 61 [35 (26)] -1.701e+09 (1.803e+09) [-.943] -1.906e+09 (1.902e+09) [-1.002] -1.951e+09 (1.665e+09) [-1.171]
USA 61 [35 (26)] -1.325e+09 (1.584e+09) [-.836] -1.415e+09 (1.641e+09) [-.862] -1.355e+09 (1.442e+09) [-.94]
ROW 61 [35 (26)] -7.971e+09 (5.956e+09) [-1.338] -8.452e+09 (6.064e+09) [-1.394] -7.887e+09 (4.662e+09) [-1.692]
USA, USITC 61 [35 (26)] -1.267e+09 (1.535e+09) [-.825] -1.350e+09 (1.590e+09) [-.849] -1.294e+09 (1.392e+09) [-.93]
Model 2—Mirror Exports, Shares
EU 61 [35 (26)] .133 (.063) [2.123] .138 (.057) [2.41] .167 (.063) [2.6433]
USA 61 [35 (26)] .054 (.042) [1.268] .052 (.045) [1.16] .059 (.046) [1.275]
ROW 61 [35 (26)] -.187 (.081) [-2.314] -.19 (.075) [-2.52] -.226 (.08) [-2.8436]
Standard errors in brackets, Z values reported for the Kernel and Radius estimates and T-statistics reported for the Stratification estimates (these are reported in square brackets). All standard
errors bootstrapped with 250 replications. Critical values Z(α = 0.05) = 1.96; Z(α = 0.1) = 1.64; t60,0.1 = 1.296; t60,0.05 = 1.671; t75,0.1 = 1.293;
t75,0.05 = 1.666. Outcome variables EU, USA and ROW are obtained from UN Comtrade (WITS) database. The Level variable USA–USITC is obtained from the USITC database.
Covariates used in matching include proxies for governance (corruption), economic structure, gravity type variables.
In addition, to the propensity score matching carried out above, the nearest neigh-
bour matching based on Abadie and Imbens (2002, 2011) and Abadie et al. (2001) is
shown in Tables (8 - 10). The results are not very different from those presented in
Table (4). Each of the three tables (Tables 8 - 10) show two sets of results. The first
set replicates the results of the propensity score matching results provided under model
1. While the second set of results incorporates additional covariates (three additional
covariates—physical capital per worker, land per worker and human capital). In a few
of the cases the ATT estimate becomes significant. The differences across the three
tables relate to the modelling of the ATT estimate. For all three tables the matching
covariates are used in adjusting any resulting bias in the ATT estimate. Tables (9 & 10)
both use an exact matching procedure via the Mahalanobis metric using the low income,
lower middle income, majority christian and majority muslim dummies. Table (10) in
addition to the Mahalanobis metric adjusts for heteroscedasticity and heterogeneity in
the treatment. Do these results provide any further insight or support the earlier results?
Even though there are slight differences, in most cases the signs are the same and it does
provide support for the earlier results. The differences in the size of the adjustments are
due to the slightly different algorithms used and the sample sizes. These tables use a
much larger number of controls and thus the sample ATT are different in some of the
cases compared to Table (4). Taking into account these differences, does provide sup-
port for the earlier results. Now returning to the differences in the three tables (Tables
8, 9 & 10) it is useful to observe that apart from a handful of cases the estimates are
quite similar. The estimates for Tables ( 9 & 10) are the same since the algorithm does
not affect the ATT estimate but adjusts the standard error for heteroscedasticity. After,
adjusting the standard errors for heteroscedasticity large increases in the Z-values are
observed for the second set of results with the additional covariates. On the other hand,
the first set of results do not show such large increases in the Z-values.
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To summarise, the evidence from the three tables are not that different from from
those already presented. The levels of the variables are insignificant in the first set of
results and are mixed in the second set in each table. Again, among the first set of results
preferential import shares are significantly higher for beneficiaries, ceteris paribus. The
no programme shares are significantly lower in majority of the cases. The gsp shares on
the other hand are insignificant in all first set of results in the three tables. The shares for
the mirror exports to the EU, USA and ROW on the other are not significant in all three
tables for the first set of results. The levels of mirror exports to the USA–UN Comtrade
(and USA–USITC), EU and ROW are insignificant in all three tables for the first set.
On the contrary, the levels of no programme and preferential imports are significant in
the first column of Table (10) while gsp is not significant in any of the three tables in the
first column.
For the second set of results, there are some changes in the significance for some of
the first set of results. One has to be careful of the Z-values reported for the additional
covariates in Table (10). These Z-values are astronomically larger than before and occur
mostly where there was no significance earlier. For example, the gsp shares and levels
become significant in all three tables (with the exception of the gsp share in Table (8).
In addition, the levels of the mirror exports are not significant in all the first two tables
but do become significant in Table (10). Moreover, the shares of mirror exports become
significant for the EU in all three tables while it is significant for the USA in Table (10).
Last but not the least, the shares for ROW is significant in Table (9). Finally, the Z-values
have increased by more than 10 fold in some cases. The increase in Z-values are much
less for the shares compared to the levels. The poor performance of the levels in the first
set of results might account for these increases. This might also be due to unobserved
factors that affect the level but not the shares of the outcome variables. Another reason,
might be that there is a significant problem of heteroscedasticity in the level data—
given that the data is spatially distributed and the beneficiaries are heterogeneous in
their export levels to the USA.
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Table 8: Nearest Neighbour matching based on Abadie and Imbens (2011) &
Abadie et al.’s (2001)
Covariates based on Model 1a With additional covariatesb
Outcome N SATT Std. Error Z-value N SATT Std. Error Z-Value
Imports in Levels
No Programme 124 -1309903495.31 1432430690.45 -.914 85 -25882923072 18815472175.4 -1.376
GSP Preferences 107 -315413537.16 293216986.78 -1.076 74 -6089381653.33 2065856642.65 -2.948
Non–GSP Preferences 124 463351911.67 370168829.94 1.252 85 123751201.01 52565301.27 2.354
Import Shares
No program 124 -.192 .066 -2.909 85 -.365 .138 -2.645
GSP Preferences 107 -.019 .05 -.38 74 -.2 .311 -.643
Non–GSP Preferences 124 .196 .058 3.379 85 .277 .072 3.847
Mirror Exports in Levels
EU 124 -808144579.20 1299563442.21 -.622 85 -32911056392 22932237521.4 -1.435
USA–UN Comtrade 124 -1142069804.80 1891425684.12 -.604 85 -28822828584 20769195815.78 -1.388
USA–USITC 124 -1105849230.63 1834878081.05 -.603 85 -28213371226.67 20394823698.29 -1.383
ROW 124 -8710094314.06 7163662602.28 -1.216 85 -99458835010.67 75939560104.41 -1.31
Share of Mirror Exports
EU 124 .012 .071 .169 85 .46 .215 2.14
USA-UN Comtrade 124 .085 .064 1.328 85 .021 .071 .296
ROW 124 -.097 .076 -1.276 85 -.481 .254 -1.894
Critical values Z(α = 0.05) = 1.96; Z(α = 0.1) = 1.64. Matching Variables: landlocked, LI, LMI, Majority Christian, Majority Muslim
Distance (Weighted, in logs), Real GDP (logs), Distance squared, Real GDP squared, LI × Real GDP, LMI × Real GDP, UMI × Real GDP. Bias-adj
Variables: landlocked, LI, LMI, Majority Christian, Majority Muslim Distance (Weighted, in logs), Real GDP (logs), Distance squared, Real GDP squared,
LI × Real GDP, LMI × Real GDP, UMI × Real GDP. aCovariates used in estimating propensity score model 1 are used here for comparison. The
no. treated is 35, controls is 89; bAdditional covariates — land and capital per worker as well as human capital are included and are also included in the
bias–adjustment. The no. treated is 24, controls is 61
Table 9: Exact Nearest Neighbour matching based on Abadie and Imbens (2011)
& Abadie et al.’s (2001) Mahalanobis metric
Covariates based on Model 1a With additional covariatesb
Outcome N SATT Std. Error Z-value N SATT Std. Error Z-Value
Imports in Levels
No Programme 124 -1383519630.63 1406286367.77 -.984 85 -30008790707.50 20516215156.51 -1.463
GSP Preferences 107 -318564636.11 286293803.19 -1.113 74 -6265815473.33 3089757132.06 -2.028
Non–GSP Preferences 124 463022147.24 370145260.79 1.251 85 94974882.54 54396084.11 1.746
Import Shares
No program 124 -.189 .066 -2.864 85 -.193 .078 -2.474
GSP Preferences 107 -.02 .051 -.392 74 -.203 .095 -2.137
Non–GSP Preferences 124 .197 .059 3.339 85 .262 .078 3.359
Mirror Exports in Levels
EU 124 -875510493.71 1279498078.93 -.684 85 -44878021386.67 31930887146.14 -1.405
USA–UN Comtrade 124 -1219358141.26 1860734265.85 -.655 85 -34438102120.33 23851234386.94 -1.444
USA–USITC 124 -1177128155.43 1805135140.51 -.652 85 -33313150246.67 23155377075.03 -1.439
ROW 124 -8862764382.17 7012019042.90 -1.264 85 -102725023114.67 72586518977.41 -1.415
Share of Mirror Exports
EU 124 .019 .069 .275 85 .353 .163 2.166
USA-UN Comtrade 124 .081 .061 1.328 85 -.375 .358 -1.047
ROW 124 -.1 .078 -1.282 85 .023 .338 .068
Critical values Z(α = 0.05) = 1.96; Z(α = 0.1) = 1.64. Matching Variables: landlocked, LI, LMI, Majority Christian, Majority Muslim
Distance (Weighted, in logs), Real GDP (logs), Distance squared, Real GDP squared, LI × Real GDP, LMI × Real GDP, UMI × Real GDP. Bias-adj
Variables: landlocked, LI, LMI, Majority Christian, Majority Muslim Distance (Weighted, in logs), Real GDP (logs), Distance squared, Real GDP squared,
LI× Real GDP, LMI× Real GDP, UMI× Real GDP. Exact matching done on LI, LMI, Majority Christian and Majority Muslim. aCovariates used in
estimating propensity score model 1 are used here for comparison. The no. treated is 35, controls is 89; bAdditional covariates — land and capital per
worker as well as human capital are included and are also included in the bias–adjustment. The no. treated is 24, controls is 61
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Table 10: Exact Nearest Neighbour matching based on Abadie and Imbens
(2011) & Abadie et al.’s (2001) Mahalanobis metric with heteroscedastic robust
standard errors
Covariates based on Model 1a With additional covariatesb
Outcome N SATT Std. Error Z-value N SATT Std. Error Z-Value
Imports in Levels
No Programme 124 -1383519630.63 826180404.76 -1.675 85 -30008790707.50 1526213084.26 -19.662
GSP Preferences 107 -318564636.11 164894258.68 -1.932 74 -6265815473.33 225918881.93 -27.735
Non–GSP Preferences 124 463022147.24 295556432.64 1.567 85 94974882.54 41738645.09 2.275
Import Shares
No program 124 -.189 .036 -5.25 85 -.193 .039 -4.949
GSP Preferences 107 -.02 .032 -.625 74 -.203 .03 -6.767
Non–GSP Preferences 124 .197 .034 5.794 85 .262 .044 5.955
Mirror Exports in Levels
EU 124 -875510493.71 1322960115.95 -.662 85 -44878021386.67 2557840431.44 -17.545
USA–UN Comtrade 124 -1219358141.26 1135439134.53 -1.074 85 -34438102120.33 1792193387.65 -19.216
USA–USITC 124 -1177128155.43 1099434047.89 -1.071 85 -33313150246.67 1748665147.41 -19.051
ROW 124 -8862764382.17 4028653655.83 -2.2 85 -102725023114.67 6595064059.91 -15.576
Share of Mirror Exports
EU 124 .019 .047 .404 85 .353 .055 6.418
USA-UN Comtrade 124 .081 .054 1.5 85 -.375 .045 -8.333
ROW 124 -.1 .071 -1.408 85 .023 .075 .307
Critical values Z(α = 0.05) = 1.96; Z(α = 0.1) = 1.64. Matching Variables: landlocked, LI, LMI, Majority Christian, Majority Muslim
Distance (Weighted, in logs), Real GDP (logs), Distance squared, Real GDP squared, LI × Real GDP, LMI × Real GDP, UMI × Real GDP. Bias-adj
Variables: landlocked, LI, LMI, Majority Christian, Majority Muslim Distance (Weighted, in logs), Real GDP (logs), Distance squared, Real GDP squared,
LI× Real GDP, LMI× Real GDP, UMI× Real GDP. Exact matching done on LI, LMI, Majority Christian and Majority Muslim. aCovariates used in
estimating propensity score model 1 are used here for comparison. The no. treated is 35, controls is 89; bAdditional covariates — land and capital per
worker as well as human capital are included and are also included in the bias–adjustment. The no. treated is 24, controls is 61
The summary of the results presented in this section is that, firstly, agoa beneficiaries
had higher shares of preferential exports relative to the counter-factual set of countries
with preferential exports to the USA. Secondly, a larger decline in no programme ex-
ports share is observed for agoa beneficiaries relative to the counter-factual countries.
Thirdly, in the case of the gsp shares no significant changes are observed an indication
that majority of the change in agoa shares were mostly obtained from the no programme
shares. Moving on to the shares of mirror exports, an increase is observed for agoa bene-
ficiaries relative to the counter-factual exports to the EU only after including additional
covariates in the Mahalanobis nearest neighbour matching. Turning now to the levels,
the no programme and gsp decrease relative to the counter-factual. On the contrary agoa
exports increase relative to the counter-factual. The same cannot be said of the levels for
the mirror exports to the USA, EU and ROW—these are insignificant and do not provide
much information about the performance relative to the counter-factual countries.
Answering the following questions summarises and puts forward the implications of
the results presented in this section.
• Do the nearest neighbour Mahalanobismatching invalidate the earlier results
obtained by the propensity score matching? They do not invalidate the results.
As explained earlier the differences in algorithms and size of controls used in
matching has led to variations in ATT estimates. Most importantly, the signs and
significance levels are similar for the first set of results which are an attempt to
replicate the propensity score matching results of model 1.
• Should one be worried about the variation in ATT? The various algorithms and
matching types do provide different estimates. What one needs to keep an eye on
is, whether there are very different results across the various matching estimates.
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As long as the results have the same signs and do not vary from significantly
negative to significantly positive estimates—there should be no need to lose faith
in the results.
• Are the results robust enough? The results have been consistent across the vari-
ous tables for the no programme and preferential shares and thus these results are
robust enough. The remaining results vary in significance across the tables. In a
way some of these are consistently not significant. These insignificant ATT out-
come estimates imply that, there are no differences between the agoa beneficiaries
and the counter-factual countries. Thus, there is essentially no difference between
the treated and control countries in terms of these outcome variables.
• What are the implications of the results? Agoa beneficiaries have definitely
observed an increase in their share of agoa exports to the USA and a definite
decrease in their share of no programme exports. The gsp shares have stayed
relatively at the same levels. The shares of exports to the EU and the USA (in some
cases) have gone up for the beneficiaries relative to the counter-factual. That of
exports to the ROW has decreased relative to the counter-factual On the contrary,
the levels do not provide any clear answers to what has happened to the level of
exports to EU, USA and ROW. On the few occasions, significant estimates are
observed for these outcomes—they point to an increase in exports to the EU and a
decrease in exports to ROW by beneficiaries relative to the counter-factual. On the
contrary, no programme exports have decreased while agoa exports have increased
relative to the counter-factual.
The following conclusion can be drawn from the preceding.
• Export shares for agoa has risen while that of no programme has decreased
• Export shares for both the USA and EU have also gone up while shares for ROW
has gone down.
• The level exports for agoa has increase while that of no programme exports has
decreased.
This leads to the conclusion that the agoa preference has not hurt exports of be-
neficiaries to the EU. Rather, the exports of beneficiaries to the rest of the world has
been hit harder by the agoa preference. A reason for the EU exports maintaining its
share of beneficiary exports is due to the competing preferences offered by the EU. The
remaining countries within ROW do not offer preferences beyond the gsp. Nonethe-
less, Canada, Japan and Australia are not major export destinations of the beneficiary
countries although they also offer the gsp preference to SSA. The main changes in agoa
exports have been due to compositional changes in exports and a slight increase in over-
all exports to the USA. The next section discusses the results of the disaggregated mirror
exports.
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4.3 Disaggregated Mirror exports to the USA, EU and ROW
The table in this section reports results for disaggregated exports to the USA, EU and
ROW. The disaggregation is based on Hanson (2010) who suggests using eight sectors.
The sectors are
• Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood—HS 01–10 & 12–14
• Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper—HS 11, 15–24, 44–48
• Extractive industries—HS 25–27 & 68–71
• Chemicals, plastics, rubber—28–36 38–40
• Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear—HS 41–42 & 50–65
• Iron, steel, and other metals—HS 26, 72–83
• Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment—84–89
• Other industries—HS 37, 43, 49, 66–67 & 90–97.
The justification for the disaggregation is based on the similarities among the indus-
tries within each sector above (Hanson, 2010). Hanson (2010) also notes that, the factor
intensities, technology and institutional foundations behind production are likely to be
similar for each group (Hanson, 2010, 8). It is on this basis that, the choice of disag-
gregation is chosen. this would allow a better comparison among the treated and control
countries. Tables (11–12) present results for the shares and levels of the disaggregated
mirror exports respectively.
The results in table (11) shows very poorly determined results for the kernel (with
bandwith=0.001). Only the first ATT estimate in this column is significant at the 10%
level of significance. The ATT estimates for mirror export shares to the USA under ex-
tractive and other industries are significant in all remaining columns. The ATT estimates
for the EU shares under the iron, steel and other metals product group is also signifcant
in all columns except for the kernel (bandwidth=0.001). On average and ceteris paribus
agoa beneficiaries increased their share of mirror exports to the USA for extractive in-
dustries between 6.4% and 8.7% compared to the control group of countries. On the
contrary, their mirror export shares to the USA for other industries reveal a decline of
0.21% and 0.29%.
On average and ceteris paribus relative to the control countries in terms of mirror
exports to the EU, there is an increase in the share of iron, steel and other metal products
of 3.99% – 5.9%. Additionally, a couple of significant ATT estimates are observed under
the stratification and radius matching columns. In terms of food, beverages, tobacco,
wood and paper product group, radius (δ = 0.05) and kernel (bandwidth=0.01) indicate
a significant increase of 6.2% relative to the control.
On the contrary, under stratification matching, the mirror export shares to ROW
declines relative to the control significantly (4.3%). There are marginal increases for
the USA in iron, steel and other metals relative to the control—this is significant under
stratification matching. Last but not the least, mirror export shares to ROW decline
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significantly relative to the control for machinery, electronics, and transport equipment
products (2.6%–3.1% in the first and last two columns) and other industries (0.71% in
the last column).
The result for textiles, apparel, leather and footwear product shares are not signi-
ficant in any of the columns contrary to the positive impact reported in the empirical
literature (for example, Collier and Venables, 2007). To investigate this further, table
(25) in the appendix does a breakdown of the ATT for apparel and textile products (ex-
cluding leather and footwear) and all non apparel and textile products. Again, apparel
and tetile shares are all not significant. However, the share of non apparel and textile
products have increased for the agoa beneficiaries relative to the control countries for
the EU (11.9%–12.8%) and the USA (5.8%–6.3%) respectively, on average and ceteris
paribus. The estimates are significant at the 5% level of significance. The shares to
ROW on the other hand, decreased relative to the control countries by 12.1% – 12.7%
on average and ceteris paribus. The level outcomes in the table, on the contrary present
a statistically significant decrease in mirror exports to all three destinations relative to
the control countries for apparel and textile products, ceteris paribus. That of non ap-
parel and textile products are insignificant for the level outcomes. The decrease is less
than US$ 600 million for the kernel and radius matching estimates. On the other hand,
the stratification matching estimates are approximately US$ 200–290 million more than
the kernel and radius estimates.
The final table in this section, table (12) presents the results for the level outcomes.
The extractive industries and the iron, steel and other metals sub-sectors do not report
any significant estimates as their counterparts in the previous table did. Also, the kernel
and radius estimates perform poorly and do not report significant ATT estimates except
for mirror exports to the USA and ROW of agriculture, meat, diary and seafood sector
and mirror exports to the USA for other industries. For all the cases where the strat-
ification estimates are significant, the significant kernel/radius estimates reported are
smaller than the stratification estimates in absolute value—ranging from US$ 20–US$
230 million.
The result for the USA for other industries is similar in sign and significance to
that obtained for the shares. The decline in shares is supported by a decline in the
level outcomes relative to the control of US$ 100 – 120 million, ceteris paribus. The
remaining significant outcomes for the shares, that is extractive industries (USA) and
iron, steel and other metals (EU) are no longer significant for the levels. However, to
the extent that they are not significant and the magnitude of the variables are smaller,
they do not imply an exaggeration of the earlier result for the shares. The decline in the
mirror exports for the extractive industry is less than US$ 16 million for the USA while
that of iron, steel and other metals is less than US$ 20 million (kernel/radius estimates)
and US$ 80 million (stratification estimate) for the EU. Such decreases compared to the
larger decline in the other product groups could still provide the positive effects reported
in table (11) for the shares.
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Now turning to the textiles, apparel, leather and footwear product group, the results
support that presented in table (25) in the appendix. This sector experiences a decline
to all three destinations and the estimates are significant at the 5% level. The decline
in mirror exports varies from US$ 422–736 million for ROW, US$ 558–797 million for
the USA and US$ 722–1,118 million for the EU. In all cases the decline is larger for
the EU compared to the USA and ROW which might explain why regression estimates
in the agoa empirical literature supports a positive impact for apparel and textile ex-
ports to the USA. However, comparing agoa beneficiaries to the counter-factual set of
countries presents a different story. Some of this might be explained by the similarity of
preferences in apparel and textile products offered to the Caribbean Basin countries (the
Caribbean Basin Trade Protection Act (CBTPA)) and the free trade areas concluded with
the Central American countries and Dominican Republic. This provides the Caribbean
Basin countries a competitive edge over their SSA counterparts given that they are much
closer to the USA market and therefore are more likely to have lower transport costs.
Nonetheless, only a few of the agoa countries export significant volumes of apparel and
textile products.
In concluding, this section draws attention to the products for which agoa bene-
ficiaries have higher exports to the USA relative to the counter-factual countries. Of
these products, the extractive industries seem to be more dominant within the group of
products exported to the USA. The extractive industry’s dominance might be explained
by the presence of petroleum and petroleum products (HS 27). Within this category,
exports are driven by Angola and Nigeria who are major oil exporters. In addition, gold,
silver and precious metals (HS 71) form a significant component of exports from the fol-
lowing agoa beneficiaries—South Africa, Ghana, Mali, Tanzania, Guinea, Congo DR
and Ethiopia. This is one result that finds support in the empirical literature Frazer and
Van Biesebroeck (2010), Tadesse and Fayissa (2008, for example, ). On the contrary,
the same support was not found for apparel and textile exports. Much of the positive
estimates provided by the empirical literature is probably due to the much larger decline
in apparel and textile exports to the EU compared to the competitive decline in apparel
and textile exports to the USA. This explains Collier and Venables (2007) results which
compares apparel and textile product exports to the USA relative to the EU. The reported
impact of 638.9%–1315% in their study is relative to the EU and it is for total exports.
The results presented here is consistent with Collier and Venables (2007) given that the
magnitude of the decline for exports to the EU is much larger than that of the EU in this
section. Therefore, a regression of the ratio of the two outcomes would show that agoa
countries exported more relative to the EU.
A second reason why apparel and textiles is not significant compared to the em-
pirical literature is due to the construction of the counter-factual. Here, countries are
matched and are thus comparable in terms of the competitiveness and comparative ad-
vantages. This, then reduces the differences between the countries and provides one with
the results obtained here. Nonetheless, the existing empirical literature rarely constructs
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the counter-factual in this way—the regressions in these studies include all developing,
middle and some high income countries. Meanwhile, not all middle and high income
countries produce the apparel and textiles products produced by the agoa countries.
One way to establish whether the passage of time has led to the decline observed in the
results would be to perform an annual analysis for apparel and textile exports. This is
however, not carried out in the present analysis. The removal of the multi-fibre arrange-
ment might have dampened the impact of the flexible preference arrangements provided
for apparel and textiles.
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4.4 Differences in Outcomes
Turning to the matched difference-in-difference, the results are not observed to be much
different from the earlier results in terms of the impact on the outcomes. The results are
shown for both the ratios and the levels of the outcomes. Tables (13 & 16) report the
results for the ratios while tables (14-15) report the levels of the outcome. The base year
outcomes are 1997 and 1999 respectively. The post-agoa time period (2002–2010/11)
is compared to the base years and used in the difference-in-difference matching.
Table (13) reports results for the shares of the various components of imports by the
USA from developing countries. The results for the gsp shares are again mostly insigni-
ficant. The results for non–gsp shares are significant for all differences except for some
estimates in the kernel (bandwidth=0.001) column. The kernel (bandwidth=0.001) does
poorly in all the other outcomes in this section. The results indicate that no programme
shares declined significantly while non–gsp shares increased. Based on the table, non–
gsp shares increased relative to the control countries by more than 10%, on average and
ceteris paribus. The difference for 2004/1999 and 2004/1997 were the largest for the
non–gsp shares—increasing by approximately 30%. The results are quite robust given
that there are no sign reversals and significance is obtained in almost all columns—as
well as for the estimator that on average has been returning insignificant estimates—
Kernel (bandwidth=0.001).
The results for the levels are worse as shown in table (14). For no programme im-
ports, the ATT estimates declined between US$ 300 and US$ 970 million relative to the
control countries. The estimates are significant for the first four years of agoa compared
to the base years chosen. Non–gsp outcomes are only significant under stratification
matching. The kernel (bandwidth=0.06) for the 2002/1999 difference is the only other
significant estimate reported. the increase in non–gsp imports relative to the control
countries ranges between US$ 140 and US$ 720 million.
Table (15) reports the results for mirror exports to the three destinations. Results
for the USA are reported based on two different data sources—the USITC and WITS
data sources. The results for the levels report one significant estimate—mirror exports
to the EU for the 2004/1997 difference. The difference is significant indicating that the
difference in mirror exports to the EU between 2004 and 1997 was US$ 620 million
less than the control countries, ceteris paribus. Mirror exports to the USA (for both
data sources) show significant estimates for the 2002/1997 difference. This indicates
that, mirror exports were US$ 399–430 million less than they were in 1997 relative
to the control countries, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, mirror exports to ROW
is significant in a few columns for the 2002/1997, 2002/1999, 2003/1997, 2003/1999,
and 2005/1999 difference-in-difference estimates. The decline relative to the control
countries ranges from US$ 600 million in 2002 to US$ 1,600 million in 2003.
The final table in this section, table (16) shows the results for the shares of mirror
exports to the three destinations. The shares of mirror exports to the EU and ROW report
insignificant estimates. Nevertheless, there are two significant estimates for the share of
43
mirror exports to the USA for the 2005/1999 difference. The difference implies that,
agoa beneficiaries had their shares increase by 5.9% between 2005 and 1999 relative to
the control countries, on average and ceteris paribus.
In concluding, the results for the levels are mostly insignificant. This might be due
to the fact that the African beneficiaries export lower volumes than the control group of
countries. On the contrary their exports to the rest of the world have in most cases sig-
nificantly decreased compared to the control group of countries. The exports shares for
the composition of imports by the USA reports more significant results. This points to
the increasing importance of USA in the exports of the beneficiary countries compared
to the control countries.
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4.5 Annual Outcomes
The annual outcomes are also calculated to show the annual variation in outcomes.
Tables (17 & 18) report the annual ATT estimates for the outcome variables.
The first table in this section (table 17) reports the results for the shares. The shares
have more significant estimates compared to the previous table for level estimates. the
shares of mirror exports to ROW declined relative to the control countries. The decline
ranges from 14.2% in 2001 to 11.6% in 2010. The share of mirror exports to the EU in-
creased relative to the control countries. Significant estimates are recorded for all years
except 2009 and for the kernel (bandwidth=0.01). The estimates reported by the default
kernel and radius (δ = 0.05) are quite similar. On the contrary, the estimates for the
kernel (bandwidth=0.01) is twice that of the other two matching estimators. The share
of mirror exports to the EU varies from 23.9% in 2001 to 15.7% in 2010. Results of the
USA shares are not significant in any of the three columns. Turning to the composition
of imports by the USA, the insignificance of the gsp shares is again noticeable. There is
one exception—the 2004 estimate is significantly higher relative to the control countries
in the second (6.9%) and fourth (6.95%) columns.
The remaining outcomes, share of non–gsp and no programme imports are signi-
ficant for all years and across all three columns. Also noticeable, is that, the kernel
(bandwidth=0.01) is no longer twice the estimate of the other matching estimates—it is
now closer to the other estimates. This further confirms the robustness of the results.
The share of non–gsp increases relative to the control countries from 7.8% in 2001 to
13.6% in 2011. Much of the increase in shares is observed between 2003 and 2006
(20.3%–29.3%). This is also consistent with the decline relative to the control countries
of the no programme shares (21.8%–37.3%). The no programme shares decline relative
to the controls from 12.1% in 2001 to 12.14% in 2011. As mentioned earlier, there are
higher declines in between the period.
The gsp, non–gsp, mirror exports to the EU and mirror exports to the USA (and USA
Imports, USITC) do not report any significant estimates in the final table (table 18). The
default kernel estimate (bandwidth=0.06) has significant estimates for no programme
imports in the year 2002–2005. The no programme imports declined relative to the
counter-factual from US$ 800 million in 2002 to US$ 1,238 million in 2005. Mirror
exports to ROW on the other hand reports significant declines relative to the control
countries for all years except 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2010. The estimate varies from US$
2,243 million in 2001 to US$ 6,190 million in 2009.
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Table 17: Annual Results for Mirror Exports/Import Shares (Model 1)
Variable (Year) Kernel (bw=0.06) Kernel (bw=0.01) Radius (δ = 0.05)
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW
2001 (N=74) -.1417 (.0731) [-1.939] -.2433 (.0805) [-3.024] -.1453 (.0725) [-2.004]
2002 (N=74)) -.1545 (.0755) [-2.047] -.2533 (.0915) [-2.769] -.1581 (.0747) [-2.117]
2003 (N=74) -.1214 (.0806) [-1.507] -.2096 (.0976) [-2.148] -.1268 (.0796) [-1.593]
2004 -.1152 (.0745) [-1.548] -.1983 (.106) [-1.87] -.1211 (.0752) [-1.611]
2005 -.1284 (.0722) [-1.779] -.2404 (.0949) [-2.533] -.133 (.0725) [-1.836]
2006 -.1259 (.068) [-1.851] -.2173 (.0873) [-2.489] -.1287 (.0692) [-1.861]
2007 -.1092 (.0705) [-1.55] -.2036 (.0973) [-2.094] -.1144 (.0711) [-1.609]
2008 -.1251 (.066) [-1.897] -.2193 (.0892) [-2.457] -.1261 (.0668) [-1.889]
2009 -.1158 (.0662) [-1.749] -.205 (.1011) [-2.027] -.1202 (.0659) [-1.823]
2010 -.1162 (.0607) [-1.915] -.1943 (.0873) [-2.225] -.1201 (.0609) [-1.972]
Share of Mirror Exports, EU
2001 .1292 (.0755) [1.711] .239 (.0887) [2.693] .1326 (.075) [1.769]
2002 .1515 (.0797) [1.901] .2513 (.0956) [2.629] .1543 (.0791) [1.951]
2003 .1092 (.0777) [1.406] .1989 (.0982) [2.025] .1139 (.0776) [1.468]
2004 .0749 (.0738) [1.015] .1656 (.0971) [1.705] .079 (.0745) [1.062]
2005 .0797 (.0709) [1.124] .1811 (.0908) [1.996] .0839 (.0712) [1.179]
2006 .0862 (.0642) [1.342] .184 (.0757) [2.432] .0881 (.0656) [1.342]
2007 .0642 (.0661) [.971] .1593 (.09) [1.769] .0688 (.0659) [1.045]
2008 .0706 (.0545) [1.297] .1608 (.0742) [2.166] .0717 (.0564) [1.271]
2009 .0581 (.0608) [.954] .1475 (.091) [1.62] .0618 (.0602) [1.026]
2010 .0785 (.053) [1.48] .1567 (.0821) [1.908] .0815 (.0528) [1.545]
Share of Mirror Exports, USA
2001 (N=74) -.0031 (.0518) [-.06] -.0024 (.0629) [-.038] -.0019 (.0514) [-.036]
2002 (N=74) -.0126 (.0493) [-.256] -.0074 (.0599) [-.123] -.0108 (.0492) [-.219]
2003 (N=74) -.007 (.0527) [-.132] -.0028 (.057) [-.049] -.0048 (.0527) [-.092]
2004 .0403 (.0459) [.878] .0327 (.0683) [.479] .0421 (.047) [.897]
2005 .0487 (.0475) [1.024] .0593 (.0682) [.869] .0491 (.0483) [1.017]
2006 .0398 (.047) [.847] .0332 (.07) [.475] .0406 (.0476) [.853]
2007 .0451 (.0458) [.985] .0443 (.0678) [.654] .0455 (.0462) [.984]
2008 .0545 (.0425) [1.283] .0584 (.0648) [.901] .0544 (.043) [1.264]
2009 .0578 (.0406) [1.422] .0575 (.0611) [.941] .0584 (.041) [1.424]
2010 .0377 (.0358) [1.055] .0376 (.0502) [.75] .0386 (.0362) [1.065]
Share of Non–GSP out of Total Imports by USA from Country i
2001 (N=74) .0789 (.0338) [2.334] .0918 (.0482) [1.905] .0808 (.0342) [2.362]
2002 (N=74) .157 (.0494) [3.177] .1586 (.066) [2.403] .1591 (.0505) [3.15]
2003 (N=74) .2185 (.0515) [4.24] .245 (.0661) [3.707] .2204 (.0524) [4.208]
2004 .2931 (.0574) [5.106] .3065 (.077) [3.983] .2925 (.0579) [5.049]
2005 .2511 (.0572) [4.393] .3028 (.0794) [3.813] .2502 (.0579) [4.325]
2006 .2033 (.0524) [3.878] .2043 (.0655) [3.119] .2025 (.0529) [3.825]
2007 .188 (.0506) [3.712] .2031 (.0671) [3.028] .1864 (.051) [3.655]
2008 .167 (.0578) [2.891] .16 (.0828) [1.932] .1679 (.057) [2.945]
2009 .1548 (.053) [2.917] .1604 (.0684) [2.345] .154 (.0533) [2.888]
2010 .1444 (.0488) [2.959] .1562 (.0601) [2.597] .1438 (.0491) [2.931]
2011 .1368 (.048) [2.852] .1367 (.0632) [2.163] .1364 (.0481) [2.836]
Share of GSP out of Total Imports by USA from Country i
2001 (N=70) .0308 (.0541) [.568] .0432 (.0908) [.475] .0312 (.054) [.578]
2002 (N=70) .0095 (.0522) [.182] .0298 (.0833) [.358] .012 (.0518) [.231]
2003 (N=70) .0121 (.0666) [.182] .029 (.107) [.271] .0152 (.0655) [.232]
2004 (N=70) .069 (.0371) [1.859] .0837 (.0658) [1.273] .0695 (.0377) [1.844]
2005 (N=70) -.0292 (.0687) [-.424] -.0344 (.0942) [-.365] -.0275 (.0675) [-.407]
2006 (N=70) -.0008 (.0698) [-.011] .0163 (.0857) [.19] .0025 (.0692) [.036]
2007 (N=70) -.0388 (.0763) [-.509] -.0348 (.0999) [-.349] -.0361 (.075) [-.481]
2008 (N=70) -.0024 (.0476) [-.051] .0291 (.0634) [.46] -.0034 (.0486) [-.07]
2009 (N=70) .0111 (.038) [.292] .0383 (.0633) [.605] .0111 (.0386) [.288]
2010 (N=70) -.0052 (.0247) [-.211] -.0006 (.029) [-.022] -.0055 (.0251) [-.218]
2011 (N=70) -.0261 (.0256) [-1.017] -.0109 (.0277) [-.395] -.0263 (.0268) [-.98]
Share of No Program out of Total Imports by USA from Country i
2001 (N=74) -.121 (.056) [-2.161] -.1668 (.0896) [-1.861] -.122 (.0552) [-2.21]
2002 (N=74) -.1781 (.0608) [-2.931] -.2111 (.0899) [-2.348] -.1811 (.0607) [-2.984]
2003 (N=74) -.2437 (.0691) [-3.525] -.3034 (.0987) [-3.074] -.2467 (.0691) [-3.569]
2004 -.3732 (.0601) [-6.207] -.4164 (.0895) [-4.651] -.3727 (.0596) [-6.249]
2005 -.2414 (.0819) [-2.946] -.314 (.1087) [-2.889] -.2416 (.0807) [-2.993]
2006 -.2178 (.0796) [-2.737] -.2543 (.0961) [-2.645] -.2188 (.0787) [-2.779]
2007 -.167 (.0819) [-2.038] -.2084 (.106) [-1.965] -.1671 (.0802) [-2.083]
2008 -.179 (.0657) [-2.726] -.2116 (.0989) [-2.139] -.1795 (.0658) [-2.728]
2009 -.1733 (.0624) [-2.779] -.2063 (.0827) [-2.494] -.1723 (.0632) [-2.725]
2010 -.1498 (.0554) [-2.706] -.1724 (.0676) [-2.55] -.1486 (.0555) [-2.681]
2011 -.1214 (.052) [-2.333] -.1401 (.0726) [-1.931] -.1201 (.0516) [-2.326]
Bootstrapped Standard errors with 250 replications in brackets. Unless otherwise indicated N=75. Z values reported for the Kernel and Radius
estimates and T-statistics reported for the Stratification estimates (these are reported in square brackets). Critical values Z(α = 0.05) =
1.96;Z(α = 0.1) = 1.64; t70,0.1 = 1.294; t70,0.05 = 1.667; t75,0.1 = 1.293; t75,0.05 = 1.666.
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Table 18: Annual Results for Mirror Exports/Imports levels (Model 1)
Variable (Year) Kernel (bw=0.06) Kernel (bw=0.01) Radius (δ = 0.05)
No Program Imports
2001 -655391173.09 (480400597.14) [-1.364] -455538257.24 (498549971.9) [-.914] -670795530.32 (540401562.9) [-1.241]
2002 -866873508.18 (493507538.96) [-1.757] -637943685.59 (488677252.44) [-1.305] -873198430.30 (557939238.32) [-1.565]
2003 -899227159.23 (557705729.87) [-1.612] -614868228.14 (569709824.44) [-1.079] -894659108.36 (618056228.68) [-1.448]
2004 -1114104465.76 (614123285.67) [-1.814] -836023419.11 (560067401.51) [-1.493] -1099525933.79 (678667195.04) [-1.62]
2005 -1238224767.79 (757847495.07) [-1.634] -857017022.31 (745117346.84) [-1.15] -1224583150.85 (829919811.26) [-1.476]
2006 -1210665073.26 (951625527.80) [-1.272] -760067759.03 (1075099974.88) [-.707] -1192789003.5 (1013175202.15) [-1.177]
2007 -1177116689.35 (1045670986.6) [-1.126] -726810977.65 (1272856230.28) [-.571] -1123397742.25 (1069945994.78) [-1.05]
2008 -857717596.38 (1267094132.41) [-.677] -274217422.37 (1666175616.53) [-.165] -780683586.41 (1257642459.83) [-.621]
2009 -1025966014 (942012010.03) [-1.089] -641533141.46 (1133518504.72) [-.566] -939412491.08 (913953655.57) [-1.028]
2010 -959649181.15 (1284277784.21) [-.747] -519828380.24 (1744629424.29) [-.298] -838951245.78 (1244591565.5) [-.674]
2011 -1021889733.25 (1463351233.83) [-.698] -486336768.28 (2035594759.4) [-.239] -855735776.83 (1398348261.36) [-.612]
GSP Imports
2001 (N=70) 21987982.76 (76823949.85) [.286] 13391290.95 (140624200.78) [.095] 31418138.08 (75861000.18) [.414]
2002 (N=70) 7365389.63 (85393088.99) [.086] -12323403.26 (169194792.38) [-.073] 20290336.7 (81515708.83) [.249]
2003 (N=70) 33403855.8 (115980491.2) [.288] 1932604.04 (233910080.54) [.008] 49901764.4 (111501350.82) [.448]
2004 (N=70) 15669824.46 (102956464.93) [.152] -37476001.81 (209775680.3) [-.179] 36670807.53 (92999618.88) [.394]
2005 (N=70) 5933160.11 (136169776.78) [.044] -63075688.95 (285688194.99) [-.221] 32519247.38 (124262780.82) [.262]
2006 (N=70) 32211469.11 (201557008.71) [.16] -61292757.45 (431512660.45) [-.142] 67732523.42 (187373370.18) [.361]
2007 (N=70) 70527502.17 (199551807.1) [.353] 3499789.59 (398468623.76) [.009] 101148585.7 (191659903.29) [.528]
2008 (N=70) 1212270.29 (114997983.78) [.011] -78887581.94 (217585514.5) [-.363] 24582116.28 (102181159) [.241]
2009 (N=70) -31154671.54 (69026147.84) [-.451] -98821274.48 (145409693.84) [-.680] -13990184.04 (55421006.14) [-.252]
2010 (N=70) -41268795.08 (80408411.2) [-.513] -120156892.95 (152097388.94) [-.79] -20323882.1 (62993711.62) [-.323]
2011 (N=70) -65039130.27 (86220631.12) [-.754] -148090583.08 (156875142.91) [-.944] -42453995.43 (67402150.53) [-.63]
Non GSP Imports
2001 133172683.55 (110383934.53) [1.206] 172196217.95 (184213556.24) [.935] 129408687.48 (112991946.82) [1.145]
2002 133007606.24 (88690876.42) [1.5] 162500029.16 (149296472.97) [1.088] 130825510.46 (90542784.58) [1.445]
2003 185175102.48 (149072390.82) [1.242] 220890430.11 (245829672.76) [.899] 180072563.02 (153039319.35) [1.177]
2004 506667586.43 (394776358.16) [1.283] 655459429.84 (659284429.55) [.994] 486520967.88 (403885321.93) [1.205]
2005 693321357.01 (558222133.86) [1.242] 939165633.13 (923066744.1) [1.017] 662382254.04 (570686720.12) [1.161]
2006 515669769.3 (460825186.69) [1.119] 742366622.67 (753503898.12) [.985] 483326196.28 (472785984.99) [1.022]
2007 595954294.15 (503180140.6) [1.184] 799570559.63 (828664604.25) [.965] 562011355.04 (516155631.82) [1.089]
2008 739974889.66 (543139197.68) [1.362] 1023338528.04 (883872955.27) [1.158] 708921767.75 (552982022.93) [1.282]
2009 295183580.74 (249068004.67) [1.185] 439266891.5 (398004993.15) [1.104] 278276249.89 (255354598.65) [1.09]
2010 354084490.97 (291731265.27) [1.214] 544221160.53 (463961368.78) [1.173] 334369487.78 (297928908.35) [1.122]
2011 396888386.2 (328723076.78) [1.207] 626548131.36 (520562523) [1.204] 372871772.92 (336220964.82) [1.109]
Mirror Exports EU
2001 -587473297.52 (667297466.99) [-.88] -580337578.94 (714249413.46) [-.813] -535621747.48 (680752966.26) [-.787]
2002 -583934669.66 (646108063.30) [-.904] -559378656.63 (633748739.69) [-.883] -525826036.69 (656262235.79) [-.801]
2003 -864330750.37 (796592270.79) [-1.085] -901424336.13 (864788831.92) [-1.042] -793120137.33 (809683322.30) [-.98]
2004 -1205205431.91 (974501294.32) [-1.237] -1255900318.83 (1005912459.48) [-1.249] -1112176204.19 (983939409.87) [-1.13]
2005 -1276876594.05 (1195067581.28) [-1.068] -1418336831.45 (1379220115.4) [-1.028] -1164349669.92 (1195139480.27) [-.974]
2006 -1707270513.13 (1445455964.18) [-1.181] -1829147807.89 (1752909171.23) [-1.043] -1582683355.69 (1439741885.99) [-1.099]
2007 -2031257387.41 (1680956528.86) [-1.208] -2070495377.82 (1833715136.84) [-1.129] -1877467513.58 (1669369836.31) [-1.125]
2008 -2169314028.53 (2195477541.13) [-.988] -2167635583.71 (2433401561.67) [-.891] -1975744821.85 (2167276875.15) [-.912]
2009 -1903054069.31 (1511191454.13) [-1.259] -1889729286.01 (1703086720.75) [-1.11] -1723323731.58 (1465237446.58) [-1.176]
2010 -2483918976.98 (1872844161.12) [-1.326] -2709421090.97 (2339014343.5) [-1.158] -2265073770.69 (1823445925.96) [-1.242]
Mirror Exports USA
2001 (N=74) -560643457.56 (547239796.45) [-1.024] -280998789.82 (696418979.62) [-.403] -556692202.76 (571447746.38) [-.974]
2002 (N=74) -797324953.38 (535551871.08) [-1.489] -524432034.39 (668952025.41) [-.784] -775274108.02 (554862793.32) [-1.397]
2003 (N=74) -779526428.99 (652257428.01) [-1.195] -424250821.92 (881264330.45) [-.481] -737432313.36 (663003898.21) [-1.112]
2004 -593211432.01 (856946427.48) [-.692] -145204951.55 (1140203868.28) [-.127] -578634277.09 (899866786.59) [-.643]
2005 -542637948.24 (1148271916.31) [-.473] 118545694.33 (1630365343.81) [.073] -534745209.42 (1190401521.61) [-.449]
2006 -653959635.89 (1355728445.29) [-.482] 70659865.77 (1939458412.66) [.036] -635158435.85 (1385537929.95) [-.458]
2007 -501809191.57 (1511827154.44) [-.332] 228468198.42 (2194280622.74) [.104] -452420877.4 (1516451508.63) [-.298]
2008 -120995816.04 (1787572197.86) [-.068] 756011072.64 (2614929453.25) [.289] -49439570.59 (1769456533.92) [-.028]
2009 -777917186.09 (1157467109.97) [-.672] -263542444.86 (1555892663.66) [-.169] -688728992.19 (1121057231.77) [-.614]
2010 -679710539.39 (1562216236.5) [-.435] -76826473.45 (2243144278.33) [-.034] -552861277.77 (1513121313.06) [-.365]
Mirror Exports ROW
2001 (N=74) -2243693115.41 (1283388461.35) [-1.748] -2727888136.19 (1541570927.26) [-1.77] -2219213885.27 (1394229056.17) [-1.592]
2002 (N=74) -2291960653.67 (1377934100.23) [-1.663] -2675773520.75 (1454174351.34) [-1.84] -2253621879.58 (1488807952.05) [-1.514]
2003 (N=74) -2948475916.9 (1674238865.42) [-1.761] -3684363607.58 (2076372172.4) [-1.774] -2876817404.12 (1789315799.49) [-1.608]
2004 -3594987736.06 (2307204349.54) [-1.558] -4285638372.49 (2812874193.96) [-1.524] -3536539873.04 (2546322310.35) [-1.389]
2005 -4434755039.28 (2666687765.32) [-1.663] -5545249351.85 (3561872350.32) [-1.557] -4317800506.46 (2896305625.9) [-1.491]
2006 -5305809019.97 (3232908124.52) [-1.641] -7233516011.82 (5214469158.97) [-1.387] -5141739938.58 (3451768365.39) [-1.49]
2007 -6141410475.57 (3855789973.38) [-1.593] -8328652412.74 (6071599794.36) [-1.372] -5924744765.49 (4091604860.21) [-1.448]
2008 -7296215344.32 (4801521158.49) [-1.52] -10827937561.28 (8189222479.59) [-1.322] -6918737565.6 (4987766444.42) [-1.387]
2009 -6190084403.14 (3765354574.58) [-1.644] -7882528650.91 (5426931487.96) [-1.452] -5913041610.06 (3926814772.16) [-1.506]
2010 -7724709189.38 (5028744276.07) [-1.536] -9851279628.24 (7331414117.53) [-1.344] -7356019822.69 (5232804929.49) [-1.406]
USA Imports,USITC
2001 -479089144.47 (544834815.62) [-.879] -198291342.9 (653714067.83) [-.303] -491203729.43 (596352696.55) [-.824]
2002 -702066319.06 (539788955.67) [-1.301] -409864355.42 (619163897.41) [-.662] -700827399.19 (593801010.80) [-1.18]
2003 -650526101.06 (658018457.96) [-.989] -286719056.63 (805038966.92) [-.356] -638403369.20 (703815864.6) [-.907]
2004 -567209961.71 (823544296.56) [-.689] -131705415.54 (1079461872.28) [-.122] -556076902.41 (869532605.81) [-.64]
2005 -504635791.23 (1107697920.67) [-.456] 137312385.08 (1560548278.14) [.088] -501019302.7 (1153128783.76) [-.434]
2006 -614305726.65 (1307804230.09) [-.47] 96080562 (1861216079.18) [.052] -600893508 (1341604323.99) [-.448]
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2007 -462024140.96 (1461904896.96) [-.316] 249300184.12 (2118556172.69) [.118] -418401548.5 (1470632311.07) [-.285]
2008 -86421474.95 (1726841705.54) [-.05] 763886162.21 (2525180333.62) [.303] -21885497.32 (1713689072.46) [-.013]
2009 -747321281.44 (1115802709.34) [-.67] -248512532.58 (1496002699.92) [-.166] -663690669.98 (1084046010.21) [-.612]
2010 -632382484.74 (1506073059.39) [-.42] -48035169.48 (2167786157.66) [-.022] -514383399.25 (1463582728.08) [-.351]
2011 -677920271.94 (1700956658) [-.399] 29179448.53 (2483651220.57) [.012] -517404025.18 (1636068893.89) [-.316]
Bootstrapped Standard errors with 250 replications in brackets. Unless otherwise indicated N=75. Z values reported for the Kernel and Radius estimates and
T-statistics reported for the Stratification estimates (these are reported in square brackets). Critical valuesZ(α = 0.05) = 1.96;Z(α = 0.1) = 1.64;
t70,0.1 = 1.294; t70,0.05 = 1.667; t75,0.1 = 1.293; t75,0.05 = 1.666.
Figure (7) plots the annual estimates for no programme and non–gsp shares for each
year. Given the close similarity in estimates for the shares of non–gsp and no programme
imports across the estimators, the annual estimates of the Kernel (bandwidth=0.06) are
shown in figure (7). In addition, these two are shown in the figure since their annual
effect estimates are significant throughout the period. The discussion earlier pointed
towards higher estimates between 2002 and 2006 and this is evident in the figure. After
2006, the decline in magnitude is probably influenced by the financial crisis and reces-
sion that the USA experienced—thereby leading to lower imports. Figure (8) on the
other hand, plots the means of the annual estimates for these shares as well as the share
of mirror exports to ROW. The mean annual shares for the period are consistent with the
estimates reported in tables (4 – 7) in section (4.2). This highlights that averaging the
post-agoa period did not affect the estimates obtained.
2001 2004 2011
2001 2004 2011
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Figure 7: Kernel (bandwidth=0.06) annual ATT estimates for non–gsp and no programme
shares based on Table (17), 2001–2011
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Figure 8: Average Annual ATT Estimates (2001-2011) based on Table (17)
4.6 Sensitivity tests of outcome variables
This section highlights the results of the sensitivity tests carried out to test the robust-
ness of the ATT estimates presented in the previous sections. Table (19) presents the
sensitivity analysis for the ATT estimates reported in tables (4–7 & 14–15). The base
outcomes are the kernel (bandwidth=0.06) estimates reported in the tables above. The
ATT estimates based on the simulated unobserved effects are also based on the kernel
(bandwidth=0.06) estimator.
The sensitivity results reported in table (19) provide the odds of a confounder (un-
observed factor) affecting the ATT estimates. As long as the ATT estimates are not
driven down to zero the presence of any confounders have not significantly altered the
results. In this case, different confounders are not experimented. However, the compar-
ison is made across models. To account for this, the sensitivity analysis reported in the
appendix further analyses model 1 and varies the effects of the unobserved factors by
having several gamma values in the table. All three tables (tables 19 & 26–27) allow the
model to be checked for any influence from the unobserved factors. However, they are
based on different assumptions and modelling frameworks (these are presented in the
footnotes to the respective tables).
The sensitivity analysis for the levels and shares for the various USA import categor-
ies in table (4–7) are similar to the ATT estimated by simulating the unobserved effects
reported in table (19). On the contrary, results for the mirror exports are affected by the
simulated unobserved factors. Mirror exports to the EU, USA and ROW are 26%, 78%
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and 26% higher than the base ATT estimates respectively (calculated as [base ATT –
simulated ATT]/base ATT). The result for the USA is almost twice the base ATT indic-
ating that the outcome and selection effects of the order 4.69 and 2.81 respectively are
enough to exaggerate the treatment effect.
The shares on the hand are 1%, 18% and 4.8% higher for the EU, USA and Row re-
spectively. Again, the USA has the highest increase based on the simulated unobserved
effects. However, relative to the levels, output and selection effects larger than four are
required to have a similar effect to the levels. For model 2, the ATT based on the simu-
lated unobserved effects are much closer to the baseline ATT reported. Thus, 9%, 20.8%
and 10.3% of the baseline estimates are explained by the simulated unobserved effects.
Again, the shares produce smaller discrepancies between the ATT reported. This is 6%
for the EU—however, for the USA and ROW the simulated unobserved effects increase
the ATT estimates by 20.4% and 1.6% respectively.
The simulated unobserved effects so far in this section have shown that apart from
mirror exports to the USA (levels), they are quite robust to the simulated unobserved ef-
fects. For these outcomes, output and selection effects much larger than four are required
to reduce the estimated ATT to zero. On the other hand, small output and selection ef-
fects of the order of approximately four and three are just enough to almost double the
baseline ATT estimate. A caveat for for the simulation exercise is that, the simulated
unobserved effects are based on a binary transformation of the continuous outcomes
used in the study. In addition, rounding up of the shares in some cases exaggerate some
of the results. To get around these, Rosenbaum’s bounds analysis is implemented next
with the results shown in the appendix. Not only do these tables show the sensitivity of
the results but also, all the various models run previously have provided different ways
of looking at the impact of the preference on the beneficiaries.
The sensitivity analysis in table (26–27) tests for effects of the unobserved effects
present in the model to see if they affect the estimated ATT. Much of the results shown
for the two tables tend to move in the same direction. The results so far point to selec-
tion on observables being satisfied. However, it is expected that, the sensitivity results
presented in this section would help in answering the question of whether one should be
worried about the presence of “selection on unobservables.”
The difference between tables (26 & 27) is the size of the caliper used. Table (26)
is based on the nearest neighbour matching with a caliper of 0.05 while table (26) is
based on a caliper of 0.01. Table (26) has non-gsp shares, non-gsp level (2002–1997),
mirror export shares to the EU (2002–1997), and mirror export shares (2010–1999)
have higher gamma values than the remaining outcomes. The non-gsp shares have the
highest gamma value of 4—indicating that a high level of unobserved effects is required
to affect the outcome recorded. The three remaining outcomes have values less than 2—
indicating they are less robust to the unobserved effects compared to the non-gsp shares.
However, they are more robust than the remaining outcomes that are not significant.
The significance level used here is the 5% level. Using the 10% level would increase
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the value of gamma reported for the significant outcomes. In addition, non-gsp levels
become significant at a gamma value less than 1.4.
The results reported in table (27) show similar upper and lower probability values
with the exception of non-gsp levels being significant at a gamma value of 2 at the
5% level of significance. On the contrary, non-gsp levels (2002–1997) are significant
at a lower value of gamma. The mirror export shares to the EU and USA that were
significant are no longer significant for the case where the caliper is 0.01. Nonetheless,
non-gsp levels (2010–1999) in the earlier table was not significant but is now significant
at the 1.5 gamma value. Rosenbaum (1991a,b) notes that having high values of gamma
is not a sufficient condition to rule out the presence of unobserved factors (Rosenbaum,
1991a,b). Likewise having low values of gamma may not always imply that there are
unobserved factors. Moreover, a low value of gamma does not also rule out that the
confounders might not be present. Thus, these results are not the ultimate answer to the
problem of unobserved effects but do help in checking for problems and in accepting the
possibility of unobserved factors driving the results (Rosenbaum, 1991a,b). From the
results presented so far, there is some indication of the presence of unobserved effects.
However, in majority of the cases it is not enough to drive the estimated effects to zero.
This removes the doubts hanging over the significant estimates and one can be confident
in the the effects presented so far.
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Table 19: Main Text: Sensitivity Analysis for Levels and Import share (All models)
Variable ATT Output Effect Selection Effect
Model 1
No programme -1.349e+09 4.845 3.348
GSP Imports -66442312 4.82 2.512
Non-GSP Imports 3.924e+08 4.485 3.941
Non-GSP/Total Imports .191 4.564 3.832
GSP/TT Imports .014 4.716 2.443
No Programme/Total Imports -.215 5.179 1.644
Mirror export Share ROW -.13 4.597 2.148
Mirror export Share EU .091 4.396 3.207
Mirror export Share USA .039 4.451 2.693
Mirror exports, EU -1.868e+09 4.424 3.003
Mirror exports, USA -1.057e+09 4.69 2.809
Mirror exports, ROW -6.140e+09 4.801 3.573
No programme (2002–1997) -6.515e+08 4.64 3.612
Imports, USA (USITC) (2002–1997) -4.523e+08 5.358 3.702
Non-GSP imports (2002–1997) 1.362e+08 5.088 4.077
GSP imports (2002–1997) 61417588 4.67 2.504
Mirror exports, EU (2002–1997) -2.234e+08 4.831 3.633
Mirror exports, USA (2002–1997) -4.963e+08 4.645 3.749
Mirror exports, ROW (2002–1997) -8.251e+08 4.522 3.192
Model 2
No programme -1.253e+09 4.423 3.453
GSP Imports -2.004e+08 4.125 2.568
Non-GSP Imports 4.131e+08 5.198 3.619
Non-GSP/Total Imports .203 4.95 4.223
GSP/Total Imports -.033 4.541 2.417
No Programme/Total Imports -.175 5.317 1.76
Mirror export share, ROW -.19 4.659 2.035
Mirror export share, EU .125 4.518 3.178
Mirror export share, USA .065 4.407 2.469
Mirror export, EU -1.547e+09 4.363 2.897
Mirror export USA -1.049e+09 4.321 2.784
Mirror export, ROW -7.153e+09 5.132 2.906
Model 3
No programme Imports -1.285e+09 4.609 3.213
GSP Imports -1.954e+08 4.611 2.534
Non-GSP Imports 4.182e+08 4.703 3.936
Non-GSP/Total Imports .203 4.296 3.576
GSP/Total Imports -.038 4.554 2.465
No Programme/Total Imports -.17 5.358 1.876
The methods here are described in Ichino et al. (2006) and Nannicini (2007). 100 replications are conducted. The binary transforma-
tion is based on the mean value of each outcome (Y). The simulation is based on the following assumptions of the confounder, P11 =
Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1, T = 1) = 0.60; P10 = Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1, T = 0) = 0.50;
P01 = Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1, T = 0) = 0.50; P00 = Pr(U = 1|I(Y > Y¯ ) = 0, T = 0) = 0.2;
P1. = Pr(U = 1|T = 1) = 0.52; P0. = Pr(U = 1|T = 0) ≡ 0.23 − 0.26. The output effect is the aver-
age odds ratio of U based on a logit model of Pr(I(Y > Y¯ ) = 1|T = 0, U,W ). The selection effect is the average odds
ratio of U based on Pr(T = 1|U,W ). T is the treatment, W is the observable vector of covariates and U is the unobserved
(or confounding) factors. Output effect = Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=1,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=1,W ) /
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=1|T=0,U=0,W )
Pr(I(Y>Y¯ )=0|T=0,U=0,W ) . Selection effect
=
Pr(T=1|U=1,W )
Pr(T=0|U=1,W ) /
Pr(T=1|U=0,W )
Pr(T=0|U=0,W ) .
5 Discussion
In summary, shares for the various categories of USA imports and shares out of the
total mirror exports to the EU, USA and ROW tend to provide more significant and
well-determined coefficients. The level outcome variables are not well-determined and
do a poor job in providing the a priori treatment impacts expected. Some explanations
for this can be due to the presence of heterogeneous impacts, unobserved heterogeneity
which the sensitivity tests and Rosenbaum’s bounds tests tend to indicate are present in
some cases. On the contrary, when the shares are used the heterogeneity in impact and
the unobserved heterogeneity are reduced and their effect is not as significant as in the
levels case.
The poor performance of the levels can be attributed to a number of reasons. For
instance, one cannot completely rule out the presence of unobserved factors. Secondly,
the response by agoa recipients is quite heterogeneous. The uptake of preferences has
not been the same across the beneficiaries—as well as some beneficiaries export relat-
ively larger volumes of products while majority export less than US$ 1 million. One
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could also argue that the distance from the USA (even though this has been controlled
for in the propensity score regression) provides the Caribbean countries a competitive
edge over the SSA counterparts—hence the negative ATT estimates in some cases. In
other words, controlling for distance does not control for transport costs. Hence, trans-
port costs might an observed factor that needs to be controlled for the level regressions
to account for the poor results. Besides, the level of imports from majority of the agoa
beneficiaries are smaller relative to the other countries. Nonetheless, given the small
base of exports, their exports to the USA has shot up—hence their importance which
is represented by the positive increases in the share of exports to the USA. This might
explain why the shares perform better and show a positive increase in favour of exports
to the EU and USA as well as for non–gsp exports. A probable reason for this is that, the
shares clean up much of the unobserved factors driving the results seen for the levels.
In addition, transport costs are not important in explaining the shares. It is the belief of
the author that, the positive regression estimates reported in the empirical literature are
an artefact of the importance of USA shares in the exports of the agoa beneficiaries.
The product results are consistent with the empirical literature in some cases. The
caveat here is that the mirror exports for the products are based on total product exports
and does not consider exports under agoa specifically. An analysis on the product ex-
ports under the various USA import categories might point towards higher level exports
or shares. The results are much closer to Collier and Venables (2007) who compared
all apparel and textile exports to the USA relative to the EU—and found higher apparel
and textile exports to the USA relative to the EU. Also Tadesse and Fayissa (2008) used
the total volume of exports for their product categories. Although apparel and textiles
and a number of other products are not significant in this study the similarity is in the
definition of the mirror export volume used—which includes non agoa exports. On the
contrary, the work of Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) focussed on exports under
agoa and hence there are some differences in the results obtained. For the results to be
consistent with Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) products not covered by agoa must
be excluded.
Moving to the general results, the diversion of exports from ROW to agoa beneficiar-
ies is contrary to Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) who suggested that agoa exports
were not diverted from other destinations. Nevertheless, for product exports there were
cases of diverted exports from the EU, however, the main cases of diversion occurred
for destinations where existing export shares were already low.
In summarising the results the following facts arising from the analysis is presented
below.
1. Agoa beneficiaries have not experience rapid increases in their exports relative to
the counter-factual
2. Agoa beneficiaries have had a better performance relative to the counter-factual in
terms of their exports to the EU.
3. The value of their exports to the rest of the world has also suffered relative to the
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counter-factual
4. The shares of exports to the EU has also significantly increased compared to the
counter-factual.
5. The same cannot be emphatically concluded for their exports to the USA. They
do however, in some cases show some promise.
6. The share of exports to the rest of the world has gone down relative to the control
countries and this result tends to be beyond doubt.
7. The increase in exports has been concentrated in the extractive industries for the
USA relative to the control countries.
8. The iron, steel and other metals sector has also been at the center of the increase
in exports to the EU relative to the counter-factual set of countries.
9. The remaining products have not been well-determined. Surprisingly, the textile,
apparel, leather and footwear sector has not shown any significant increases for
agoa beneficiaries.
6 Conclusion
This paper has adopted a matching framework to estimate the impact of the agoa policy
of the USA on the exports of the beneficiary countries. The performance of the agoa
beneficiaries have been compared to a set of countries that are quite similar to the agoa
countries. These countries form the counter-factual for the performance of the outcome
variables.
The results show that agoa successfully increased the shares of exports in the be-
neficiary countries. The increase in shares mostly occurred within exports to the USA.
A large part of the increase in shares was obtained from from exports that previously
did not receive any gsp preferences. These were significant with the right signs in most
cases. The gsp preferences were not significant in most cases. The levels also provide a
similar result but not as robust as the shares. On the other hand, the exports to the USA
and EU have seen an increase in their shares while that of ROW has gone down. The
levels again are not well determined and are not significant in most cases.
Further analysis carried out using a difference-in-difference matching analysis did
support the earlier results. The difference in shares of non-gsp exports increased relat-
ively more than the difference in the outcome outcome of the counter-factual. The no
programme shares exhibited a decline relative to the control countries. The levels for
all the outcomes and the shares of exports to the three destinations did not yield several
significant estimates.
The final set of results compared the annual outcomes over the levels and shares
for both the various mirror exports to the USA and exports to the three destinations ex-
plored. The shares of mirror exports to the EU increased significantly for most of the
period while that of ROW declines significantly throughout the period. No significant
59
estimates are recorded for mirror exports to the USA. The picture for the composition
of imports by the USA is different. The levels for gsp and non-gsp imports were not sig-
nificant while that of no-programme imports significantly declined for most of the post-
agoa period. The shares recorded significant estimates for non-gsp and no-programme
imports. The shares for non-gsp increased throughout the period with larger shares re-
corded between 2003 and 2006. The shares for no-programme exports declined during
the period. Again, the decline for 2003–2006 showed larger reductions relative to the
counter-factual.
This confirms results reported in earlier studies showing an increase in exports to the
USA. The departure however, is that, the results here point towards increasing shares
but is unable to unambiguously show that the level of exports increased. The poor per-
formance of the level outcomes requires further post matching analysis on the matched
countries.
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A Appendix
Table 20: Summary Statistics
count mean min max
year 1650 2005.500 2001 2010
Mirror Exports Share-ROW 1536 0.529 0.000725 0.998
Mirror Exports Share-EU 25 1572 0.303 0.000131 0.999
Mirror Exports Share-USA 1539 0.169 0.000000809 0.959
Mirror Exports Share-USA/EU 1580 0.466 0 0.999
Mirror Exports to EU 1572 2.72e+09 1000 5.28e+10
Mirror Exports to USA 1539 2.33e+09 1327 5.69e+10
Mirror Exports to ROW 1536 8.29e+09 1568 2.22e+11
No program claimed 1650 1.95e+09 0 5.48e+10
GSP Imports 1280 1.56e+08 0 6.26e+09
Non GSP Imports 1650 2.55e+08 0 1.76e+10
Non-GSP/TT Imports 1606 0.115 0 0.988
GSP/TT Imports 1278 0.074 0 1
No prog/TT Imports 1606 0.826 0 1
Share of exports of product 1 to eu 1577 0.063 0 0.840
Share of exports of product 1 to usa 1577 0.021 0 0.650
Share of exports of product 2 to eu 1579 0.043 0 0.678
Share of exports of product 2 to usa 1579 0.011 0 0.432
Share of exports of product 3 to eu 1571 0.054 0 0.847
Share of exports of product 3 to usa 1571 0.051 0 0.906
Share of exports of product 4 to eu 1580 0.018 0 0.812
Share of exports of product 4 to usa 1580 0.007 0 0.234
Share of exports of product 5 to eu 1580 0.039 0 0.692
Share of exports of product 5 to usa 1580 0.050 0 0.958
Share of exports of product 6 to eu 1578 0.021 0 0.670
Share of exports of product 6 to usa 1578 0.006 0 0.132
Share of exports of product 7 to eu 1580 0.054 0 0.959
Share of exports of product 7 to usa 1580 0.015 0 0.727
Share of exports of product 8 to eu 1578 0.008 0 0.373
Share of exports of product 8 to usa 1578 0.004 0 0.175
Area 1570 4.08e+05 10 8.51e+06
Real GDP 1278 5757.740 145 42188.809
Weighted distance 1570 9845.144 2387.8 16764.666
Landlocked 1580 0.139 0 1
Voice & Accountability 1370 42.241 0 97
Political Stability 1290 41.012 1.5 96
Government Effectiveness 1330 42.466 1.5 98
Regulatory Quality 1340 42.306 0 100
Rule of Law 1340 40.646 0 92
Corruption 1330 43.342 0 96.5
Adj. Saving per GNI 975 8.765 -167.5 89.299
GDP per capita 1256 3026.931 62.95 27169.707
AGOA Treatment 1650 0.212 0 1
High Income (NonOECD) (HI) 1400 0.157 0 1
Low Income (LI) 1400 0.236 0 1
Lower Middle Income (LMI) 1400 0.343 0 1
Upper Middle Income (UMI) 1400 0.264 0 1
Majority Christian 1282 0.495 0 1
Majority Muslim 1282 0.303 0 1
Other Religion 1282 0.203 0 1
Observations 1650
These are based on all developing countries and not the matched sample. Export share and preferential import data is
for 2001-2010 Data for controls based on data from 1985-1999 in most cases Data from WGI are based on averages
for 1996 & 1998. 1–Agriculture, meat and dairy, seafood; 2–Food, beverages, tobacco, wood, paper; 3–Extractive
industries; 4–Chemicals, plastics, rubber; 5–Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear; 6–Iron, steel, and other metals; 7–
Machinery, electronics, transportation equipment; 8–Other industries. 1 if (Landlocked, AGOA treatment, HI, LI, LMI,
UMI, Majority Christian, Majority Muslim, Other Religion) and 0 otherwise.
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Table 21: SSA countries belonging to the agoa preference
Angola Djibouti Madagascar Rwanda
Botswana Ethiopia (excludes Eritrea) Malawi Senegal
Burkina Faso Gabon Mali Sierra Leone
Cameroon Gambia, The Mauritania South Africa
Cape Verde Ghana Mauritius Swaziland
Chad Guinea Mozambique Tanzania
Congo, DR Guinea Bissau Namibia Uganda
Congo, Rep. Kenya Niger Zambia
Cote d’Ivoire Lesotho Nigeria
Table 22: CBTPA countries including prior CAFTA-DR members
Barbados El Salvador Honduras St. Lucia
Belize Guatemala Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago
Costa Rica Guyana Nicaragua
Dominican Republic Haiti Panama
Table 23: Other countries in the data
Afghanistan Chile Libya Solomon Is.
Algeria Comoro Is. Malaysia Somalia
Argentina Eritrea Maldives Sri Lanka
Bangladesh India Mongolia Thailand
Benin Iran, Islamic Rep. Nepal Togo
Bhutan Jordan P. N. Guinea Tunisia
Brazil Kiribati Pakistan Uruguay
Burundi Laos Peru Vietnam
Cambodia Lebanon Philippines Yemen
Cent. African Rep. Liberia Sao Tome & Principe Zimbabwe
Table 24: Choice of Caliper Size
Ratio of S.Es Pooled Standard error Caliper Size
Model 1 .749 .256 .019
Model 2 .901 .29 .026
Model 3 .909 .29 .026
Model 4 .989 .304 .03
These are the suggested caliper sizes. However, we varied the
caliper sizes used in estimation of the radius matching estimates.
(Match/Unmatched)
Table 25: Robustness Check for Apparel & Textile Exports
Variable N [NT (NC)] Kernel (bw=0.06) Radius (δ = 0.05) stratification
Non Apparel & Textiles (Share of Country Total)
EU 75 [35 (40)] .125 (.064) [1.953] .1281 (.0634) [2.021] .1198 (.0655) [1.828]
USA 75 [35 (40)] .0628 (.0277) [2.264] .0631 (.0281) [2.241] .0581 (.0247) [2.354]
ROW 75 [35 (40)] -.1209 (.0708) [-1.709] -.1251 (.0711) [-1.758] -.1271 (.0734) [-1.73]
Apparel & Textiles (Share of Country Total)
EU 75 [35 (40)] -.0348 (.027) [-1.288] -.0345 (.0266) [-1.297] -.0313 (.0286) [-1.097]
USA 75 [35 (40)] -.029 (.0358) [-.812] -.0285 (.0358) [-.797] -.02 (.036) [-.555]
ROW 75 [35 (40)] -.003 (.0278) [-.109] -.003 (.0283) [-.108] .0005 (.023) [.021]
Non Apparel & Textiles (Levels)
EU 75 [35 (40)] -912528783.19 (1227247429.52) [-.744] -841872846.39 (1235421439.14) [-.681] -1388483968 (1403621411.47) [-.989]
USA 75 [35 (40)] -48301812.94 (983971115.76) [-.049] -60845079.2 (1018867419.22) [-.06] -450142016 (1036198816.75) [-.434]
ROW 75 [35 (40)] -4446158517.38 (2925977306.06) [-1.52] -4331458320.88 (3152273661.84) [-1.374] -6219127296 (3806057487.43) [-1.634]
Apparel & Textiles (Levels)
EU 75 [35 (40)] -568735170.06 (294787679.43) [-1.929] -513666038.52 (274122141.63) [-1.874] -800730752 (525236582.1) [-1.525]
USA 75 [35 (40)] -544541826.59 (239013941.78) [-2.278] -494264942.08 (224575999.92) [-2.201] -706640384 (345582105.53) [-2.045]
ROW 75 [35 (40)] -367879430.67 (163175528.92) [-2.255] -322483658.54 (142434581.89) [-2.264] -571342208 (367837643.83) [-1.553]
Bootstrapped Standard errors with 250 replications reported in parenthesis. Z-statistics reported for Kernel and Radius matching and T-statistics reported for Stratifica-
tion matching are reported in square brackets. Critical values areZ(α = 0.1) = 1.64;Z(α = 0.05) = 1.96; t75,0.1 = 1.293; and t75,0.05 = 1.666.
Apparel & Textile products in the table are based on HS 50–63. All other products HS 01–49 & HS 64–97 are included in the Non Apparel & Textile group. Outcome
variables are based on mirror exports to the EU, USA and ROW for each country i. Results are based on the propensity score calculated in Model 1
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Table 26: Rosenbaum’s Bounds Analysis for Model 1 ATT estimates with δ =
0.05
Outcome Gamma (Γ) Sign Rank (+) Sign Rank (-) prob value (+) prob value (-)
Model 1: Caliper=0.05
No programme 1 -3.0465205 -3.0465205 .99884248 .99884248
No programme 1.4 -3.9618387 -2.217633 .99996281 .98671007
No programme 1.5 -4.1625061 -2.0561779 .99998426 .98011732
No programme 1.6 -4.3546987 -1.9073656 .99999332 .97176337
GSP Preference 1 -1.8999805 -1.8999805 .97128218 .97128218
GSP Preference 1.4 -2.7990348 -1.0548291 .99743724 .85424829
GSP Preference 1.5 -2.9923239 -.88599533 .99861568 .81219
GSP Preference 1.6 -3.1763532 -.72902024 .99925429 .76700538
Non–GSP Preference 1 1.4413645 1.4413645 .07474086 .07474086
Non–GSP Preference 1.4 .58970761 2.3339133 .27769333 .00980013
Non–GSP Preference 1.5 .41792232 2.5242507 .33800197 .00579726
Non–GSP Preference 1.6 .25768188 2.7050145 .39832622 .00341507
Non–GSP Share 1 4.4387474 4.4387474 4.524e-06 4.524e-06
Non–GSP Share 1.4 3.6296091 5.3738146 .00014193 3.854e-08
Non–GSP Share 1.5 3.4771137 5.5834422 .00025342 1.179e-08
Non–GSP Share 1.6 3.3382132 5.7855458 .0004216 3.614e-09
Non–GSP Share 2 2.8838689 6.5321369 .00196411 3.242e-11
Non–GSP Share 3 2.1466262 8.1042233 .01591153 2.220e-16
Non–GSP Share 4 1.6788622 9.4180069 .04658945 0
Non–GSP Share 5 1.3404704 10.56994 .09004623 0
GSP Share 1 -.54051173 -.54051173 .70557791 .70557791
GSP Share 1.4 -1.4202818 .32392392 .92223716 .37299782
GSP Share 1.5 -1.6048217 .50150681 .94573349 .30800724
GSP Share 1.6 -1.7791722 .66816062 .96239424 .25201553
No Programme Share 1 -4.0947857 -4.0947857 .9999789 .9999789
No Programme Share 1.4 -5.0249734 -3.2807679 .99999976 .99948239
No Programme Share 1.5 -5.2323875 -3.1260591 .99999994 .99911416
No Programme Share 1.6 -5.4320431 -2.9847097 1 .99858075
USA Imports, USITC 1 -2.3422174 -2.3422174 .99041522 .99041522
USA Imports, USITC 1.4 -3.247545 -1.5033392 .99941796 .93362421
USA Imports, USITC 1.5 -3.44368 -1.3373514 .99971306 .909446
USA Imports, USITC 1.6 -3.6308577 -1.1835248 .99985874 .88169938
Mirror Exports, EU 1 -2.1129093 -2.1129093 .98269576 .98269576
Mirror Exports, EU 1.4 -3.0149841 -1.2707784 .99871504 .89809626
Mirror Exports, EU 1.5 -3.2096434 -1.1033149 .99933553 .86505479
Mirror Exports, EU 1.6 -3.3951888 -.94785577 .99965709 .82839859
Mirror Exports, USA 1 -2.3913548 -2.3913548 .99160683 .99160683
Mirror Exports, USA 1.4 -3.2973793 -1.5531737 .99951202 .9398092
Mirror Exports, USA 1.5 -3.4938307 -1.3875021 .99976194 .91735566
Mirror Exports, USA 1.6 -3.6813583 -1.2340254 .99988401 .89140326
Mirror Exports, ROW 1 -3.0137622 -3.0137622 .99870986 .99870986
Mirror Exports, ROW 1.4 -3.9286158 -2.1844101 .99995726 .98553395
Mirror Exports, ROW 1.5 -4.1290727 -2.0227439 .99998176 .97845024
Mirror Exports, ROW 1.6 -4.3210316 -1.8736985 .99999225 .96951401
No Programme (2002− 1997) 1 -4.7499514 -4.7499514 .99999899 .99999899
No Programme (2002− 1997) 1.4 -5.6894331 -3.9452271 1 .99996012
No Programme (2002− 1997) 1.5 -5.901063 -3.7947347 1 .99992609
No Programme (2002− 1997) 1.6 -6.1053829 -3.6580498 1 .99987292
USA, USITC: (2002− 1997) 1 -4.3404727 -4.3404727 .99999291 .99999291
USA, USITC: (2002− 1997) 1.4 -5.2741456 -3.5299401 .99999994 .99979216
USA, USITC: (2002− 1997) 1.5 -5.4831409 -3.3768125 1 .99963337
USA, USITC: (2002− 1997) 1.6 -5.6845455 -3.2372124 1 .9993965
Non–GSP Preference (2002− 1997) 1 2.9169061 2.9169061 .00176761 .00176761
Non–GSP Preference (2002− 1997) 1.4 2.0940652 3.8225002 .01812709 .00006605
Non–GSP Preference (2002− 1997) 1.5 1.9334128 4.0206966 .02659268 .00002901
Non–GSP Preference (2002− 1997) 1.6 1.7852198 4.2104239 .03711284 .00001274
Non–GSP Preference (2002− 1997) 2 1.2862056 4.9014864 .09918565 4.756e-07
Non–GSP Preference (2002− 1997) 3 .41628858 6.3200178 .33859941 1.308e-10
GSP Imports (2002− 1997) 1 -1.9901326 -1.9901326 .97671181 .97671181
GSP Imports (2002− 1997) 1.4 -2.8891103 -1.1476147 .99806833 .8744362
GSP Imports (2002− 1997) 1.5 -3.0826988 -.97964281 .99897432 .83636874
GSP Imports (2002− 1997) 1.6 -3.2671046 -.82357454 .9994567 .7949093
Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1 -3.3902023 -3.3902023 .99965078 .99965078
Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.4 -4.2597728 -2.6168122 .99998975 .99556226
Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.5 -4.4521427 -2.4680791 .99999577 .99320799
Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.6 -4.6368842 -2.3316109 .99999821 .99013942
Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1 -4.2267938 -4.2267938 .99998814 .99998814
Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.4 -5.0950804 -3.4784224 .99999982 .99974781
Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.5 -5.2901034 -3.3378034 .99999994 .99957776
Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.6 -5.4782305 -3.2098622 1 .999336
Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1 -2.6841683 -2.6841683 .99636447 .99636447
Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.4 -3.5305727 -1.9139146 .9997927 .97218448
Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.5 -3.715668 -1.7633678 .99989867 .96108073
Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.6 -3.892812 -1.624444 .99995047 .94785947
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1 -1.3677945 -1.3677945 .91431183 .91431183
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.4 -2.1955259 -.57886785 .98593706 .71866083
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.5 -2.3721495 -.41984949 .99115753 .66270232
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.6 -2.5399218 -.27155384 .99445611 .60701746
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1 2.2731993 2.2731993 .01150709 .01150709
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.4 1.4839649 3.1269252 .06890912 .00088322
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.5 1.3280424 3.3121057 .09208205 .00046298
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.6 1.1836215 3.4888949 .11828146 .00024251
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1 -2.1082547 -2.1082547 .98249555 .98249555
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.4 -2.9464896 -1.3298316 .998393 .90821314
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.5 -3.1278787 -1.1755786 .99911964 .88011837
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.6 -3.3009226 -1.0325546 .99951816 .84909379
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1 2.6651301 2.6651301 .00384793 .00384793
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.4 1.8814553 3.5244157 .02995501 .00021221
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.5 1.7280552 3.7121184 .04198916 .00010277
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.6 1.5864247 3.8916981 .0563215 .00004977
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Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 2 1.1085476 4.5450463 .13381271 2.746e-06
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1 -1.2149857 -1.2149857 .88781422 .88781422
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.4 -2.0537004 -.41073996 .97999763 .6593684
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.5 -2.2320716 -.24800812 .9871949 .59793591
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.6 -2.4013267 -.09605327 .99183214 .53826088
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1 .11757927 .11757927 .45320052 .45320052
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.4 -.70223278 .94072765 .75873297 .17342222
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.5 -.87202805 1.1120354 .80840349 .13306147
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.6 -1.0317959 1.2734776 .84891611 .10142431
Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1 -2.5083578 -2.5083578 .99393529 .99393529
Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.4 -3.3654189 -1.7224586 .99961787 .95750678
Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.5 -3.552114 -1.5680503 .99980891 .94156528
Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.6 -3.7305772 -1.4253037 .99990445 .92296529
Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1 -1.8616718 -1.8616718 .96867532 .96867532
Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.4 -2.7095597 -1.0665992 .99663138 .85692358
Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.5 -2.8920927 -.9080292 .99808657 .81806862
Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.6 -3.0659518 -.76067853 .99891514 .77657545
Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1 -2.449568 -2.449568 .99284863 .99284863
Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.4 -3.3057954 -1.662835 .99952644 .95182729
Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.5 -3.4921119 -1.5080484 .99976039 .93422896
Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.6 -3.6701567 -1.3648833 .99987882 .91385514
GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1 -.36034113 -.36034113 .64070398 .64070398
GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.4 -1.2375555 .50665021 .89205956 .30620015
GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.5 -1.4209359 .68539262 .92233229 .2465481
GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.6 -1.5940037 .85332912 .94453239 .19673841
Non–GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1 .5569002 .5569002 .2887978 .2887978
Non–GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.4 -.30731758 1.4369174 .62069917 .07537073
Non–GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.5 -.48479801 1.6215658 .68609017 .05244817
Non–GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.6 -.65133828 1.7960355 .74258596 .03624443
USA Imports, USITC (2010− 1999) 1 -2.2603216 -2.2603216 .98809934 .98809934
USA Imports, USITC (2010− 1999) 1.4 -3.1644874 -1.4202818 .99922323 .92223716
USA Imports, USITC (2010− 1999) 1.5 -3.3600955 -1.253767 .99961042 .89503664
USA Imports, USITC (2010− 1999) 1.6 -3.5466902 -1.0993574 .99980497 .86419392
No Programme (2010− 1999) 1 -2.637042 -2.637042 .99581838 .99581838
No Programme (2010− 1999) 1.4 -3.5465517 -1.8023459 .99980485 .9642545
No Programme (2010− 1999) 1.5 -3.7445841 -1.6382555 .99990964 .94931579
No Programme (2010− 1999) 1.6 -3.9338608 -1.4865279 .99995822 .93143022
The calculations in the table are based on Rosenbaum (1987, 1991a,b) The log odds of being in the treatment group is given by the logit model
log[Pr(T = 1|X = x, U = u)/Pr(T = 0|X = x, U = x)] = κx + γu, where γ = log(Γ), for each x, κx is an unknown
parameter, u is the unobserved variable.
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Table 27: Rosenbaum’s Bounds Analysis for Model 1 ATT estimates with δ =
0.01
Outcome Gamma (γ) Sign Rank (+) Sign Rank (-) prob value (+) prob value (-)
Model 1: Caliper=0.01
No programme 1 -1.9142857 -1.9142857 .97220814 .97220814
No programme 1.4 -2.665858 -1.2170222 .99616039 .88820213
No programme 1.5 -2.8285773 -1.0789418 .99766225 .85969317
No programme 1.6 -2.983835 -.95094222 .9985767 .82918316
GSP Preference 1 -1.3797901 -1.3797901 .91617435 .91617435
GSP Preference 1.4 -2.0935562 -.7051689 .98185021 .75964743
GSP Preference 1.5 -2.2465611 -.56992418 .98766595 .71563542
GSP Preference 1.6 -2.3921037 -.4440279 .99162394 .67148882
Non–GSP Preference 1 3.1714287 3.1714287 .00075846 .00075846
Non–GSP Preference 1.4 2.4919977 3.9408338 .00635134 .0000406
Non–GSP Preference 1.5 2.3620079 4.1116433 .00908813 .00001964
Non–GSP Preference 1.6 2.2429583 4.2758508 .01244975 9.520e-06
Non–GSP Preference 2 1.8485793 4.8790364 .03225929 5.330e-07
Non–GSP Preference 3 1.187692 6.1364088 .11747738 4.220e-10
Non–GSP Share 1 3.8857143 3.8857143 .00005101 .00005101
Non–GSP Share 1.4 3.2164159 4.6652517 .00064901 1.541e-06
Non–GSP Share 1.5 3.0910227 4.8406582 .00099734 6.470e-07
Non–GSP Share 1.6 2.9770584 5.0099511 .00145514 2.722e-07
Non–GSP Share 2 2.6061938 5.636651 .00457773 8.669e-09
Non–GSP Share 3 2.0124781 6.961195 .02208478 1.687e-12
Non–GSP Share 4 1.6428573 8.0714283 .05020623 3.331e-16
Non–GSP Share 5 1.3799733 9.0464926 .08379743 0
GSP Share 1 .73047709 .73047709 .23254931 .23254931
GSP Share 1.4 .04664559 1.4350327 .48139784 .07563888
GSP Share 1.5 -.09277843 1.5838584 .53696018 .05661298
GSP Share 1.6 -.22329721 1.7247787 .58834791 .04228368
No Programme Share 1 -3.8285713 -3.8285713 .99993557 .99993557
No Programme Share 1.4 -4.6072984 -3.1584623 .99999797 .99920696
No Programme Share 1.5 -4.7823367 -3.0327015 .99999911 .99878812
No Programme Share 1.6 -4.9512234 -2.9183307 .99999964 .99824047
USA Imports, USITC 1 -1.3714286 -1.3714286 .91487932 .91487932
USA Imports, USITC 1.4 -2.1153004 -.66646451 .9827978 .7474429
USA Imports, USITC 1.5 -2.2745261 -.52489066 .98853284 .7001704
USA Imports, USITC 1.6 -2.4259188 -.39302608 .99236518 .65284991
Mirror Exports, EU 1 -1.0285715 -1.0285715 .84815943 .84815943
Mirror Exports, EU 1.4 -1.7675798 -.31874391 .96143442 .62503964
Mirror Exports, EU 1.5 -1.9245989 -.17496355 .97286022 .56944585
Mirror Exports, EU 1.6 -2.0735507 -.04065801 .98093945 .51621574
Mirror Exports, USA 1 -1.2 -1.2 .88493031 .88493031
Mirror Exports, USA 1.4 -1.9414401 -.49260423 .97389752 .68885386
Mirror Exports, USA 1.5 -2.0995626 -.3499271 .98211634 .63680327
Mirror Exports, USA 1.6 -2.2497346 -.21684206 .9877671 .58583426
Mirror Exports, ROW 1 -2.4857142 -2.4857142 .9935354 .9935354
Mirror Exports, ROW 1.4 -3.2453926 -1.7965566 .99941355 .96379697
Mirror Exports, ROW 1.5 -3.4117892 -1.6621537 .9996773 .95175904
Mirror Exports, ROW 1.6 -3.571115 -1.5382223 .99982226 .93800288
No Programme (2002− 1997) 1 -3.6857142 -3.6857142 .99988598 .99988598
No Programme (2002− 1997) 1.4 -4.4624147 -3.0135787 .99999595 .99870908
No Programme (2002− 1997) 1.5 -4.6365337 -2.8868985 .99999821 .99805468
No Programme (2002− 1997) 1.6 -4.8044033 -2.7715106 .99999923 .99721014
USA, USITC: (2002− 1997) 1 -3.5999999 -3.5999999 .99984092 .99984092
USA, USITC: (2002− 1997) 1.4 -4.3754845 -2.9266486 .99999392 .99828684
USA, USITC: (2002− 1997) 1.5 -4.5490522 -2.7994168 .99999732 .99744028
USA, USITC: (2002− 1997) 1.6 -4.7163115 -2.6834185 .99999881 .99635631
Non–GSP Preference (2002− 1997) 1 2.0887003 2.0887003 .01836736 .01836736
Non–GSP Preference (2002− 1997) 1.4 1.4073828 2.8292747 .07965695 .00233268
Non–GSP Preference (2002− 1997) 1.5 1.2732217 2.9903197 .10146969 .00139343
Non–GSP Preference (2002− 1997) 1.6 1.1490977 3.1441848 .12525785 .00083275
GSP Imports (2002− 1997) 1 -.77927828 -.77927828 .78209209 .78209209
GSP Imports (2002− 1997) 1.4 -1.4818733 -.09879155 .93081301 .53934813
GSP Imports (2002− 1997) 1.5 -1.6304629 .03976728 .94849813 .48413932
GSP Imports (2002− 1997) 1.6 -1.771212 .16942012 .96173728 .43273309
Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1 -.47075191 -.47075191 .68109107 .68109107
Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.4 -1.171623 .21676409 .87932575 .4141961
Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.5 -1.3187777 .3578591 .90637827 .36022437
Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.6 -1.4578487 .49022725 .9275589 .31198654
Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1 -3.2303321 -3.2303321 .99938178 .99938178
Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.4 -3.9703484 -2.5819612 .99996412 .99508798
Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.5 -4.1352625 -2.4586258 .9999823 .99302649
Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.6 -4.2939801 -2.3459044 .99999124 .99050951
Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1 -2.3537595 -2.3537595 .9907077 .9907077
Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.4 -3.0813415 -1.6929543 .99896967 .95476794
Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.5 -3.2406144 -1.5639776 .99940366 .94108856
Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.6 -3.3930914 -1.4450155 .99965447 .92577326
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1 -1.4122558 -1.4122558 .92106265 .92106265
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.4 -2.1264822 -.7380951 .98326844 .7697717
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.5 -2.2796962 -.60305929 .98868716 .72676539
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2002− 1997) 1.6 -2.4254701 -.47739413 .9923557 .68345928
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1 1.8992405 1.8992405 .02876643 .02876643
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.4 1.2319881 2.6203752 .10897677 .00439165
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.5 1.1000857 2.7767227 .13564739 .0027455
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2002− 1997) 1.6 .97788799 2.9259639 .16406487 .00171695
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1 -.99020231 -.99020231 .83896238 .83896238
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.4 -1.6984419 -.31005478 .95528781 .62174034
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.5 -1.8489395 -.17230275 .9677667 .56840026
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2002− 1997) 1.6 -1.9917088 -.04363284 .97679847 .51740146
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1 1.2174618 1.2174618 .11171427 .11171427
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.4 .54053825 1.9289254 .29441294 .02687006
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.5 .40424833 2.0808852 .34301504 .01872221
Share of Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.6 .27719662 2.2252724 .39081457 .01303148
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1 -1.1849962 -1.1849962 .88199055 .88199055
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Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.4 -1.895999 -.50761187 .97101992 .69413722
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.5 -2.0477502 -.37111345 .97970778 .64472347
Share of Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.6 -2.1919062 -.24383037 .98580688 .5963189
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1 .24349236 .24349236 .40381199 .40381199
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.4 -.44724712 .94114006 .67265165 .17331654
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.5 -.58980519 1.0868317 .72233939 .1385556
Share of Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.6 -.723791 1.2242849 .76540297 .11042239
Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1 -1.7693779 -1.7693779 .96158457 .96158457
Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.4 -2.4886701 -1.100283 .99358892 .86439556
Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.5 -2.6441824 -.96754557 .99590558 .83336431
Mirror Exports, ROW (2010− 1999) 1.6 -2.7924988 -.84442294 .99738485 .80078346
Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1 -.3408893 -.3408893 .63340652 .63340652
Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.4 -1.0399183 .34846881 .85081106 .36374408
Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.5 -1.1862372 .49039957 .88223571 .31192559
Mirror Exports, USA (2010− 1999) 1.6 -1.3243836 .62369227 .90731215 .26641485
Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1 -1.3473245 -1.3473245 .91106212 .91106212
Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.4 -2.0606298 -.67224276 .98033082 .7492854
Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.5 -2.2134259 -.53678906 .98656583 .70429331
Mirror Exports, EU (2010− 1999) 1.6 -2.3587375 -.41066164 .99083138 .65933967
GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1 -1.9317062 -1.9317062 .97330213 .97330213
GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.4 -2.6533012 -1.2649139 .99601454 .89704889
GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.5 -2.8098581 -1.1332211 .99752182 .87143928
GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.6 -2.9593301 -1.0112542 .99845845 .84405261
Non–GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1 2.5714285 2.5714285 .005064 .005064
Non–GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.4 1.8834867 3.3323226 .02981722 .00043062
Non–GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.5 1.7496355 3.4992709 .04009062 .00023327
Non–GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 1.6 1.6263142 3.6592069 .05194142 .0001265
Non–GSP Imports (2010− 1999) 2 1.2121831 4.2426405 .11272115 .00001105
USA Imports, USITC (2010− 1999) 1 -.85714287 -.85714287 .80431706 .80431706
USA Imports, USITC (2010− 1999) 1.4 -1.5937195 -.14488359 .94450057 .55759859
USA Imports, USITC (2010− 1999) 1.5 -1.7496355 0 .95990938 .5
USA Imports, USITC (2010− 1999) 1.6 -1.8973666 .13552603 .97111022 .446098
No Programme (2010− 1999) 1 -.91428572 -.91428572 .81971663 .81971663
No Programme (2010− 1999) 1.4 -1.651673 -.20283704 .95069939 .58036882
No Programme (2010− 1999) 1.5 -1.8079566 -.05832118 .96469337 .52325362
No Programme (2010− 1999) 1.6 -1.9560946 .07679801 .97477299 .46939212
The calculations in the table are based on Rosenbaum (1987, 1991a,b) The log odds of being in the treatment group is given by the logit model
log[Pr(T = 1|X = x, U = u)/Pr(T = 0|X = x, U = x)] = κx + γu, where γ = log(Γ), for each x, κx is an unknown
parameter,X is the matching covariates, u is the unobserved variable.
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